SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

| IN THE | SUPREME COURT | OF THE | ONTIED | STATES |
|---------------|---------------|--------|---------|--------|
| | | | - | |
| TIMOTHY IVORY | CARPENTER, | |) | |
| | Petitioner, | |) | |
| V | | |) No. 1 | 6-402 |
| UNITED STATES | | |) | |
| | Respondent. | |) | |
| | | | | |

Pages: 1 through 91

Place: Washington, D.C.

Date: November 29, 2017

HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION

Official Reporters
1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 206
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 628-4888
www.hrccourtreporters.com

| 1 | IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES |
|----|--|
| 2 | |
| 3 | TIMOTHY IVORY CARPENTER,) |
| 4 | Petitioner,) |
| 5 | v.) No. 16-402 |
| 6 | UNITED STATES,) |
| 7 | Respondent.) |
| 8 | |
| 9 | Washington, D.C. |
| 10 | Wednesday, November 29, 2017 |
| 11 | |
| 12 | The above-entitled matter came on for oral |
| 13 | argument before the Supreme Court of the United |
| 14 | States at 10:05 a.m. |
| 15 | |
| 16 | APPEARANCES: |
| 17 | NATHAN F. WESSLER, New York, N.Y.; on |
| 18 | behalf of the Petitioner |
| 19 | MICHAEL R. DREEBEN, Deputy Solicitor General, |
| 20 | Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf |
| 21 | of the Respondent |
| 22 | |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |
| 25 | |

| 1 | CONTENTS | |
|----|-----------------------------|-------|
| 2 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF: | PAGE: |
| 3 | NATHAN F. WESSLER | |
| 4 | On behalf of the Petitioner | 3 |
| 5 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF: | |
| 6 | MICHAEL R. DREEBEN | |
| 7 | On behalf of the Respondent | 40 |
| 8 | REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF: | |
| 9 | NATHAN F. WESSLER | |
| 10 | On behalf of the Petitioner | 86 |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | | |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | | |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | | |
| 23 | | |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | | |

| 1 | PROCEEDINGS |
|----|---|
| 2 | (10:05 a.m.) |
| 3 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear |
| 4 | argument this morning in Case 16-402, Carpenter |
| 5 | versus United States. Before we commence, |
| 6 | though, I'd like to advise counsel that I'll |
| 7 | provide an additional 10 minutes of them to |
| 8 | their argument time. I don't think you'll have |
| 9 | I don't think you'll have trouble filling |
| 10 | it. |
| 11 | Mr. Wessler. |
| 12 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF NATHAN F. WESSLER |
| 13 | ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER |
| 14 | MR. WESSLER: Thank you. Mr. Chief |
| 15 | Justice, and may it please the Court: |
| 16 | At issue in this case is the |
| 17 | government's warrantless collection of 127 days |
| 18 | of Petitioner's cell site location information |
| 19 | revealing his locations, movements, and |
| 20 | associations over a long period. |
| 21 | As in Jones, the collection of this |
| 22 | information is a search, as it disturbs |
| 23 | people's long-standing, practical expectation |
| 24 | that their longer-term movements in public and |
| 25 | private spaces will remain private. |

| 1 | JUSTICE KENNEDY: So what what is |
|----|--|
| 2 | the rule that you want us to adopt in this |
| 3 | case, assuming that we keep Miller Miller |
| 4 | and Smith versus Maryland on the books? |
| 5 | MR. WESSLER: The rule we seek is that |
| 6 | longer-term periods or aggregations of cell |
| 7 | site location information is a search and |
| 8 | requires a warrant. We are not asking the |
| 9 | Court to overturn those older cases. We think |
| 10 | that the the lesson to be drawn from Riley |
| 11 | and Jones and Kyllo is that any extension of |
| 12 | pre-digital precedents to these kinds of |
| 13 | digital data must rest on their own bottom. |
| 14 | JUSTICE ALITO: How would you |
| 15 | distinguish Miller? |
| 16 | MR. WESSLER: Miller involved more |
| 17 | limited records, certainly they could reveal |
| 18 | some sensitive information, but more limited |
| 19 | records and, as this Court held, they were |
| 20 | voluntarily conveyed in that they were created |
| 21 | by the passing of negotiable instruments into |
| 22 | the stream of commerce to transfer funds. |
| 23 | What we have here is both more |
| 24 | sensitive and less voluntary. |
| 25 | THISTICE ALTTO: Why is it more why |

is it more sensitive? Why is cell site 1 2 location information more sensitive than bank records, which particularly today, when a lot 3 of people don't use cash much, if at all, a 4 5 bank record will disclose purchases? It will 6 not only disclose -- everything that the person 7 buys, it will not only disclose locations, but it will disclose things that can be very 8 9 sensitive. MR. WESSLER: I absolutely agree, 10 Justice Alito, that the information in bank 11 records can be quite sensitive, but what it 12 cannot do is chart a minute-by-minute account 13 of a person's locations and movements and 14 associations over a long period regardless of 15 16 what the person is doing at any given moment. 17 JUSTICE ALITO: Yeah, I understand that. But why is that more sensitive than bank 18 records that show, for example, periodicals to 19 which a person -- to which a person subscribes 20 or hotels where a person has stayed or 21 entertainment establishments -- establishments 22 that a person has visited --23 24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And particularly --JUSTICE ALITO: -- and all sorts of 25

- 1 other things.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Particularly because
- 3 the information in the bank records that
- 4 Justice Alito referred to are not publicly
- 5 known. Your whereabouts are publicly known.
- 6 People can see you. Surveillance officers can
- 7 follow you. It seems to me that this is much
- 8 less private than -- than the case that Justice
- 9 Alito is discussing.
- 10 MR. WESSLER: Well, I -- I don't
- 11 agree, Your Honor, for the following reason:
- When a person is engaged in a financial
- transaction, passing a -- a check, a negotiable
- instrument, that's an interpersonal transaction
- where a person has full knowledge that they are
- putting something into the stream of commerce
- 17 to transfer funds directed at their -- their
- 18 bank.
- 19 As the five concurring justices made
- 20 clear in Jones, although we may, when we step
- 21 outside, have a reasonable expectation that
- 22 someone may see where we go in a short period,
- 23 nobody has expected in -- in a free society
- that our longer-term locations will be
- 25 aggregated and tracked in the way that they can

- 1 be here.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: You keep
- 3 emphasizing longer term.
- 4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Yes, I was going to
- 5 ask about that.
- 6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Now, suppose what
- 7 was sought here was the CSLI information for
- 8 the day of each robbery, just one day, the day
- 9 of each robbery. Does that qualify as short
- 10 term in your view that would not violate the
- 11 Fourth Amendment?
- MR. WESSLER: So the -- Your Honor,
- 13 the -- the rule we proposed would be a single
- 14 24-hour period, contiguous 24-hour period.
- Now, the only other court to address this
- 16 question is the --
- 17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry, which
- 18 -- in which way are you talking about? What
- 19 rule?
- 20 MR. WESSLER: So -- sorry. So we
- 21 don't think the Court needs to -- to draw a
- 22 bright line here, to define exactly where the
- line between short and long term is, but as we
- 24 -- as we pointed out in our reply brief --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But Justice

- 1 Ginsburg is not asking you about 24 hours or
- 2 anything else. She's asking you about a tower
- 3 dump. A crime happens at a bank, the teller
- 4 says or doesn't say that the robber -- she saw
- 5 the robber on the phone at some point.
- 6 Could the police just get a tower dump
- 7 of the cell site to see who was in that area at
- 8 that time?
- 9 MR. WESSLER: Justice Sotomayor, yes.
- 10 I -- I think that would not be affected at all
- 11 by -- by this case. That would be quite short
- 12 term.
- 13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what's the
- 14 difference between a tower dump and targeting a
- 15 particular individual? Let's say an anonymous
- 16 call came in that said John X or John Doe was
- 17 at a particular -- was the robber.
- 18 Could the police then say to the
- 19 telephone company let me see the records of
- John Doe for that hour or for that day or
- 21 whatever the -- the duration of the crime was?
- MR. WESSLER: Yes. That would be
- perfectly acceptable.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So
- 25 differentiate that situation.

| 1 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: Excuse me. Could |
|----|---|
| 2 | we go back to my question? You said 24 hours |
| 3 | roughly. So, if there were only one robbery, |
| 4 | we could get that information, but now there |
| 5 | are how many, eight? So we can't get it for |
| 6 | eight, but we can get it for the one? |
| 7 | MR. WESSLER: So, Your Honor, we've |
| 8 | suggested 24 hours. I think that the most |
| 9 | administrable line, if the Court wishes to draw |
| LO | a bright line, would be a single 24-hour |
| L1 | period. |
| L2 | But this Court could could craft |
| L3 | other reasonable ways to to draw that |
| L4 | intentional line. |
| L5 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, what if it's |
| L6 | reasonable for one robbery one day, why |
| L7 | wouldn't it be reasonable equally reasonable |
| L8 | for each other robbery? |
| L9 | MR. WESSLER: Well, I I think the |
| 20 | risk is a risk of circumvention of this Court's |
| 21 | rule from Jones and of whatever the durational |
| 22 | requirement is. With some types of crimes, it |
| 23 | would be quite easy to delineate a certain set, |
| 24 | limited set, of days that that information |
| 5 | might be worth getting. Others would be more |

- 1 difficult.
- Now, in this case, it doesn't matter
- 3 to us, actually, where the Court draws that
- 4 line because 127 days of data --
- 5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the -- the
- 6 longer term is more corroborative perhaps of
- 7 innocence. Suppose he's in the area every day
- 8 for 120 days. That's because of where he shops
- 9 and so forth. So what difference?
- 10 MR. WESSLER: Well --
- 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It seems to me that
- the rule you're proposing might be avoid in --
- 13 exculpatory information.
- MR. WESSLER: Well, Your Honor, we
- 15 would fully expect that if the government
- 16 obtained a short period of data that was
- appeared to be inculpatory, that would provide
- 18 probable cause for a warrant to gather a much
- 19 wider amount of data if -- if needed, or in the
- 20 pretrial process, the defendant, him- or
- 21 herself, could obtain other records from the
- 22 carrier and use those as exculpatory evidence.
- 23 Though the concern here is with the
- 24 privacy invasion, which is quite severe over
- 25 the long term, over these more than four months

- 1 of data.
- 2 JUSTICE KAGAN: It would help me --
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I want to
- 4 understand the -- the basis for the 24-hour, or
- 5 however long you want it to be, exception. It
- 6 seems to me if there's going to be protection
- 7 extended to the information, it has to involve
- 8 some compromise of the third-party doctrine,
- 9 and if that is altered, I don't see why it
- 10 wouldn't also apply to, you know, one day of
- 11 information.
- MR. WESSLER: So the -- the only other
- court to address this question is the Supreme
- 14 Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which drew the
- line at six hours. We have suggested 24 hours
- 16 because we --
- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I don't
- 18 understand. What is the line we're drawing?
- 19 It seems to me the line is between information
- 20 to which the authorities have access and
- information to which they don't. I don't know
- 22 why we're bothering about a line between six
- 23 hours, three weeks, whatever.
- MR. WESSLER: Well, Your Honor,
- certainly we would be perfectly happy with a

- 1 rule from this Court requiring a warrant as a
- 2 per se matter. What we are trying to advance
- 3 is a -- a suggestion to the Court that takes
- 4 into account the rationale of the concurrences
- 5 in Jones and that accords with people's
- 6 reasonable expectation that although police
- 7 could have gathered a limited set or span of
- 8 past locations traditionally by canvassing
- 9 witnesses, for example, never has the
- 10 government had this kind of a time machine that
- 11 allows them to aggregate a long period of
- 12 people's movements over time.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, another
- thing the government's never had is the ability
- to go back even for 24 hours and basically test
- 16 everybody, everybody in the whole community or
- anyone who happened to be there.
- 18 So I don't know why that isn't a
- 19 consideration that cuts against preserving 24
- 20 hours two months ago.
- The government didn't have the
- 22 capability of tracking a particular individual
- or every individual, and they find out later
- that's the one they want, so I -- I don't
- 25 understand the coherence of your argument on

- 1 that point.
- 2 MR. WESSLER: Well, I -- I do think
- 3 that a different concern would be raised by the
- 4 -- the tower dump type situation that Justice
- 5 Sotomayor posited. That might involve concerns
- 6 about a dragnet search, sweeping in a large
- 7 number of innocent people.
- 8 That's not the same concern, I think,
- 9 directly before the Court here, which involves
- 10 --
- 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But isn't that the
- 12 same concern here? And that's why I -- I'm
- 13 differentiating between incident-related
- searches and basically dragnet searches when
- 15 you're looking at what a person is doing over
- 16 127, 30, 40, even 24 hours, which is it's not
- 17 related to any legitimate police need to invade
- 18 the privacy of a person over a 24-hour period,
- 19 unless there's a suggestion that the crime
- 20 occurred during that entire 24-hour period.
- 21 So that's why I asked you is there a
- 22 difference between saying if police have cause
- 23 to believe a crime has been committed, can they
- 24 ask for records related to that individual
- 25 crime, even if it happened on one day, a second

- 1 day, a fourth day, a 10th day, so long as
- 2 they're limiting their search as related to a
- 3 criminal activity, as opposed to a dragnet
- 4 sweep of everybody's intimate details?
- 5 Because, right now we're only talking
- 6 about the cell sites records, but as I
- 7 understand it, a cell phone can be pinged in
- 8 your bedroom. It can be pinged at your
- 9 doctor's office. It can ping you in the most
- 10 intimate details of your life. Presumably at
- some point even in a dressing room as you're
- 12 undressing.
- 13 So I am not beyond the belief that
- someday a provider could turn on my cell phone
- and listen to my conversations.
- 16 So I'm not sure where your 24-hour
- 17 rule comes from. Shouldn't your rule be based
- on incident-related rather than the essence of
- 19 your complaint, which is that we're permitting
- 20 police to do a dragnet search of your life?
- MR. WESSLER: Your Honor, first,
- you're absolutely correct that today, in the
- 23 seven years that have elapsed since the data
- 24 was gathered in this case, network technology
- 25 has advanced quite markedly.

| 1 | And today not only is data gathered |
|----|---|
| 2 | for phone calls but also text messages and data |
| 3 | connections, including when a phone is in a |
| 4 | pocket passively and automatically checking for |
| 5 | new e-mails or social media messages or weather |
| 6 | alerts, and today the government is able to |
| 7 | obtain historical cell site location |
| 8 | information that can locate a person as |
| 9 | precisely as half the size of this courtroom. |
| 10 | JUSTICE ALITO: Well, you know, Mr. |
| 11 | Wessler, I I agree with you, that this new |
| 12 | technology is raising very serious privacy |
| 13 | concerns, but I need to know how much of |
| 14 | existing precedent you want us to overrule or |
| 15 | declare obsolete. |
| 16 | And if I could, I'd just like to take |
| 17 | you back briefly to to Miller and ask on |
| 18 | what grounds that can be distinguished. You |
| 19 | don't say we should overrule it, and you had |
| 20 | you said the information here is more |
| 21 | sensitive. We maybe could agree to disagree |
| 22 | about that. I don't know. |
| 23 | But what else? What on what other |
| 24 | ground can Miller possibly be distinguished? |
| 25 | MR. WESSLER: So both Miller and Smith |

- 1 identified at least two factors to take into
- 2 account in the reasonable expectation of
- 3 privacy analysis: the nature of the records or
- 4 their sensitivity and whether they're
- 5 voluntarily conveyed.
- 6 And I think here there is also a great
- 7 distinction on voluntariness. Unlike a
- 8 negotiable instrument passed into commerce or,
- 9 for that matter, a phone number punched into a
- 10 touch tone phone, people when they make or
- 11 receive a phone call, receive a text message,
- and certainly when their phone is automatically
- making a data connection, do not provide their
- 14 location information to the carrier.
- JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I mean, that's a
- debatable empirical point whether people
- 17 realize what's -- what's going on, and there's
- 18 reason to think maybe they do.
- I mean, people know, there were all
- these commercials, "can you hear me now," our
- 21 company has lots of towers everywhere. What do
- they think that's about?
- The contract, the standard MetroPCS
- 24 contract seems to say -- and I quess we don't
- 25 have the actual contract in the record here --

- 1 does seem to say that -- advise the customer
- 2 that we can disclose this information to the --
- 3 to the government if we get a court order.
- 4 So I don't know whether that will hold
- 5 up. And even if it were to hold up today, what
- 6 will happen in the future if people --
- 7 everybody begins to realize that this is --
- 8 this is provided? If you have enough police TV
- 9 shows where this is shown, then everybody will
- 10 know about it, just like they know about CSI
- 11 information.
- MR. WESSLER: Three points, Your
- 13 Honor. First, in the empirical scholars'
- amicus brief at pages 3 through 4, they run
- through a result of a survey that I think quite
- 16 strongly shows that a strong majority of
- 17 Americans do not understand that this
- information is even accessible to, much less
- 19 retained by the service providers.
- 20 Second, I agree that the MetroPCS
- 21 contract in -- in effect in 2010 and the other
- 22 company's privacy policies today do disclose
- that location information can be obtained, but
- 24 I actually think the disclosures more broadly
- in those documents accrue to our favor.

- 1 I'll explain why that is in one
- 2 moment, although I -- I think I should caution
- 3 the Court that -- that relying too heavily on
- 4 those contractual documents in either direction
- 5 here would, to paraphrase the Court in Smith,
- 6 threaten to make a crazy quilt of the Fourth
- 7 Amendment because we may end up with a, you
- 8 know, hinging constitutional protections on the
- 9 happenstance of companies' policies. But those
- 10 -- those contractual documents to a company
- 11 restate and contractualize the protections of
- the Telecommunications Act and quite strongly
- promise people that their information will
- 14 remain private without consent.
- 15 And lastly --
- 16 JUSTICE ALITO: Except as provided by
- 17 law.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: As to -- as to
- other -- as to other private persons, not as to
- the government.
- 21 MR. WESSLER: That's right. There --
- there's a provision to disclose, as required by
- law, those four words need to be read in
- 24 context and in compliance with the
- 25 Constitution. So if -- if there is a

reasonable expectation of privacy in these 1 2 records, then a warrant is required. 3 But even looking at the statutory 4 framework itself, the government points to the Stored Communications Act as the -- the law 5 6 requiring disclosure. But when Congress amended that statute in 1994, it provided two 7 mechanisms for access to records: a 2703(d) 8 9 order, as used here, and a warrant under Section 2703(c)(1)(A). 10 And I think a person looking at that 11 statute would be quite reasonable and right to 12 assume that the reason there's a warrant prong 13 is to deal with records like these in which 14 there's a strong privacy interest. 15 16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But your argument, 17 as I understood it from the brief and I'm hearing it today, makes the Stored 18 19 Communications Act and the 2703(d) order 2.0 irrelevant. You don't even talk about it. In an area where we're searching for a 2.1 compromise, where it's difficult to draw a 22 23 line, why shouldn't we give very significant weight to the Congress's determination that 24

there should be and will be some judicial

```
1 supervision over this -- over -- over these
```

- 2 investigations?
- 3 MR. WESSLER: Justice Kennedy,
- 4 Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act
- 5 in 1986 and amended it in relevant part in
- 6 1994. Three-tenths of 1 percent of Americans
- 7 had cell phones in 1986, only 9 percent in
- 8 1994.
- 9 There were about 18,000 cell towers in
- 10 1994. Today there are over 300,000.
- 11 And --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, you mean --
- you mean the Act was more necessary when there
- were fewer cell phones?
- MR. WESSLER: No, not -- not --
- 16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It seems to me just
- 17 the opposite.
- 18 MR. WESSLER: Not at all, Your Honor.
- 19 My point is that Congress quite clearly was not
- thinking about the existence of and certainly
- 21 not law enforcement interest in historical cell
- 22 site location information. There is nothing in
- 23 the historical legislative record for -- for
- the members of the Court who would look there
- 25 to indicate any cognizance of these kinds of

- 1 records. So --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, again, my
- 3 question is, you give zero weight in your
- 4 arguments to the fact that there is some
- 5 protection?
- 6 MR. WESSLER: Your Honor, we
- 7 acknowledge fully that there is some
- 8 protection, a touch more than a traditional
- 9 subpoena because a judge is involved, but we
- 10 think it is insufficient in the context of
- 11 records held by a third-party in which the
- 12 subject of the investigation --
- 13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And yet you said, I
- 14 think you said in your brief, that in most of
- the cases where you get one of these 2703(d)
- orders, in the mine run of cases, you said
- there was probably enough there to get a
- 18 warrant. So let's take this very case: A
- 19 confessed robber identifies his collaborators
- and there are details about the collaborator.
- 21 Why isn't that enough to get a warrant?
- MR. WESSLER: In this case, it -- it
- is quite possible that the government could
- 24 have. Now, I -- I don't think they stated
- 25 probable cause on the face of their application

- 1 for the court order. Mr. Carpenter's name is
- 2 mentioned only once in a conclusory sentence at
- 3 the end. They did have a cooperating witness
- 4 at that point, a cooperating codefendant. And
- 5 I -- I can't say whether, had they wanted to,
- 6 they could have made out probable cause. It's
- 7 entirely possible.
- 8 I -- I want to return, Justice Alito,
- 9 to your question because I think it's important
- 10 to -- to remember that Miller and Smith were
- 11 decided four decades ago. The Court could not
- 12 have -- have imagined the technological
- 13 landscape today. And accepting the
- 14 government's invitation to -- to, in my view,
- 15 radically extend those cases would place beyond
- 16 the protection of the Fourth Amendment not only
- 17 those locations records --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Are we -- are we
- 19 radically extending them? From the very
- 20 beginning, Smith, for example, basically said
- 21 the disclosure at issue doesn't disclose the
- 22 content of the conversation. As the dissent
- 23 pointed out, the provider had access to the --
- 24 to the content of the conversation.
- Yet, we drew a line in saying cell

- 1 phone numbers, telephone numbers are 2 disclosable because everybody knows that the 3 telephone company is keeping track of those 4 numbers. You get it in your phone bill at the end of each month. 5 6 But we said people don't know or even 7 if they realize that the phone company can listen in to their conversation, that there's a 8 9 reasonable expectation that the phone company won't, absent some urgent circumstance, a death 10 11 threat, almost a special needs circumstance. 12 That suggests, as you started to say earlier, that it never was an absolute rule, 13 the third-party doctrine. We limited it 14 when -- in Bond and Ferguson when we said 15 16 police can't get your medical records without 17 your consent, even though you've disclosed your medical records to doctors at a hospital. 18
- They can't touch your bag to feel
 what's in your bag because an individual may
 disclose his or her bag to the public. I think
 one of my colleagues here said you can -- why
 shouldn't people expect others to touch their
 bag as well? Well, and the Court said no
 because you expose what your bag looks like,

2.4

1 but you don't have an expectation that people 2 are going to touch your bag. 3 So is it really that far off to say, yes, I can believe that my location at one 4 5 moment or other moments might be searched by 6 police, but I don't expect them to track me 7 down for 24 hours over 127 days? MR. WESSLER: Absolutely, Your Honor. 8 9 We agree that the contents of electronic communications should be protected, as I think 10 the government agrees in its -- its brief. But 11 12 in the digital age, content as a category is both under-inclusive and unadministrable. 13 14 Certainly, I think that's one lesson from Jones, from the concurrences. That was 15 not the content of communication. 16 It. was 17 location over time in public. But it was still 18 protected. And a great many highly sensitive 19 digital records like search queries entered 2.0 into Google, a person's complete web browsing history showing everything we read on-line, 21 medical information or fertility tracking data 2.2 from a smartphone would -- would be vulnerable. 23

-- suppose that in this case there was a

JUSTICE ALITO: Suppose that in this

24

- 1 subpoena for the -- the numbers called from the
- 2 cell phone. Would there be a problem with that
- 3 in your opinion?
- 4 MR. WESSLER: No, Your Honor. I think
- 5 that would fall squarely within the -- the rule
- of Smith. It would certainly be more
- 7 voluntary, and I think -- we can disagree, but
- 8 I think less sensitive.
- 9 JUSTICE ALITO: You think the numbers
- 10 called, the people that somebody is calling is
- 11 -- is less -- that's less sensitive than the
- 12 person's location?
- 13 MR. WESSLER: I certainly --
- 14 JUSTICE ALITO: How -- how are we
- 15 going to judge the sensitivity of -- of
- 16 information like this?
- 17 MR. WESSLER: Well, I -- I think that
- 18 the -- the concurring opinions in -- in Jones,
- 19 Your Honor, already judge the sensitivity of
- this information. The Court need not address
- 21 every other context --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose law
- 23 enforcement officers had followed this person
- 24 for 127 days. That would be worse than if they
- followed him for 24 hours?

1 MR. WESSLER: Well, as the concurrences made clear in Jones, that would be 2 3 a highly unlikely endeavor, but even more 4 unlikely here because this is not real-time. 5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, for the 6 hypothetical, suppose it happened. there can be very serious crimes in which law 7 enforcement devotes a tremendous amount of time 8 9 to surveillance with -- with multiple vehicles, multiple agents. And you say if it lasts for 10 too long, then it's an invasion of privacy? 11 12 MR. WESSLER: No, I think, you know, people's normal expectation is that that 13 typically won't happen, but if it does, the 14 Fourth Amendment does not protect against that. 15 Now, here --16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, frankly, if --17 if we're going to talk about normal 18 19 expectations and we have to make the judgment, 20 it seems to me there's a much more normal expectation that businesses have your cell 21 phone data. I think everybody, almost 22 23 everybody, knows that. If I know it, everybody 24 does. 25 (Laughter.)

- 1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But I -- I don't
- think there's an expectation that people are
- 3 following you for 127 days.
- 4 MR. WESSLER: Well, I -- I agree, but
- 5 there's --
- 6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Which is my
- 7 hypothetical.
- 8 MR. WESSLER: Well, I agree, Your
- 9 Honor, but I think that the -- the concurrences
- in Jones laid out a -- an analysis of why
- 11 there's a difference between using technology
- 12 to make that trailing -- tailing possible in
- every case as opposed to the very rare
- 14 circumstance where it might happen. But here,
- it's even a step more removed. Here, never
- 16 could police have decided today to track me 24
- 17 hours a day, seven days a week, five months
- 18 ago.
- 19 That is a categorically new power that
- is made possible by these perfect tracking
- 21 devices that 95 percent of Americans carry in
- 22 their pockets.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Wessler, can I ask
- you about your understanding of the state of
- 25 the technology now? Because the government

- 1 represents in -- in its briefs, and it has
- 2 those pictures in its briefs, suggesting that
- 3 you -- you -- that the information that's
- 4 gleaned from this is -- is very -- it's sort of
- 5 general, it's vague, it doesn't pinpoint
- 6 exactly where you are, and in order to make
- 7 effective use of it, it has to be combined with
- 8 many other pieces of information.
- 9 And, you know -- you know, A, do you
- 10 agree with that, but, B, what is your view of
- 11 -- of the relevance of the fact that
- information may not be useful in itself but may
- 13 be useful in combination with other
- information? Does that make a difference?
- 15 MR. WESSLER: Justice Kagan, so on the
- 16 first point, we agree that, as of 2010 and 2011
- 17 where the records in this case come from, they
- were generally less precise than the GPS data
- 19 in Jones, but we don't think that that makes a
- 20 difference for the Fourth Amendment rule for a
- 21 few reasons.
- 22 First, to go to the second part of
- 23 your -- your question, even in Jones, the data
- lacked precision. It was accurate only to
- 25 within 50 to 100 feet and only tracked where a

car went. So, if a person parks in a parking 1 2 lot or on a street, that GPS data by itself can't tell if they go to a jewelry store for a 3 4 stick-up or a medical clinic for a checkup or a cafe to meet with a friend. Some other amount 5 6 of evidence or inference was required. makes it no less a search in that the same is true here. 8 9 Now, in the intervening seven years, the data has become markedly more precise. 10 proliferation of small cells which can have a 11 12 broadcast radius as small as 10 meters, about half the size of this -- this courtroom, the 13 ability now of providers to estimate the actual 14 location of the phone based on the time and 15 16 angle that the signal from the phone reaches 17 the towers, and the just skyrocketing amount of 18 data usage by normal smartphone users means 19 that even the large traditional cell towers are much closer together in urban and dense 2.0 suburban areas, so the distance between them is 21 less, so they are significantly -- the location 2.2 23 information is more precise. 24 It's also more voluminous because now

data connections create location information.

- 1 And so the -- the 101 data points per day on
- 2 average in this case pale in comparison to what
- 3 --
- 4 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Just, Mr. Wessler,
- 5 along those lines, one more kind of technical
- 6 question. There was a suggestion in the briefs
- 7 that some of this information is required to be
- 8 kept by governmental regulation, the E911
- 9 program. Do you have any insight on that for
- 10 us?
- MR. WESSLER: Yeah, there's no --
- 12 there's no direct requirement that these
- location records be kept. Now, what is true is
- 14 that the -- the capability of the cell
- 15 companies to track cell phones in real-time is
- 16 a government mandate as part of the E911
- 17 system.
- 18 That is -- that capability is related
- 19 to the -- the capability that is relatively
- 20 newer to estimate the actual location of the
- 21 phone based on time and angle of the signal,
- 22 historically, coming in.
- But there's -- there's no data
- 24 retention mandate for these historical cell
- 25 phone location records.

| 1 | JUSTICE BREYER: Are |
|----|---|
| 2 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, you |
| 3 | avoid taking a position on the question in your |
| 4 | brief, but I'd like you to do take one |
| 5 | today. Is there any reason to treat grand jury |
| 6 | subpoenas differently than you would treat |
| 7 | subpoenas under other under legislation? |
| 8 | MR. WESSLER: No, I I don't think |
| 9 | there is any reason. This Court's Fourth |
| 10 | Amendment decisions involving grand jury |
| 11 | subpoenas has held on to the same Fourth |
| 12 | Amendment standard as any other subpoena. |
| 13 | Now, a grand jury subpoena is not at |
| 14 | issue here, but - but we think it would be held |
| 15 | to the same standard as any other subpoena or |
| 16 | subpoena-like request for these highly |
| 17 | sensitive records. |
| 18 | JUSTICE BREYER: Since I'm seeing your |
| 19 | argument, it it it starts with a place |
| 20 | where I completely agree. The village snoop |
| 21 | had a fallible memory and didn't follow people |
| 22 | for 127 days. |
| 23 | The electronic information is |
| 24 | infallible. You can follow them forever. |

25 That's a big change. So, I agree that that

- 1 change is there. It's there in many aspects of
- 2 life, not just location.
- Now, on the other side of it is that
- 4 probably, I'm not sure, but probably police and
- 5 FBI and others, when they get word of white
- 6 collar crime, money laundering, drugs,
- 7 financing terrorism, we can go through the
- 8 list, large numbers of cases, of important
- 9 criminal cases, they don't have probable cause.
- 10 They do have reasonable ground to think. And
- 11 they start with bank records, with all kinds of
- 12 financial information, purchases.
- So, if I accept your line, there's no
- 14 such thing in the law as location. There is,
- but, I mean, people immediately say and why?
- And then, when they say why, we're going to
- 17 have to say something like: X days, at least
- 18 arbitrary, but X days, are very personal. It
- 19 was given under circumstances where they didn't
- 20 know they were giving it or they certainly
- 21 didn't consent to it.
- 22 And that is basically the reason.
- 23 Maybe we throw a few other things in there to
- 24 get an exception from Miller. That will be
- taken immediately to the lower courts, and

- 1 eventually here, and people will say: Well,
- what about financial information, i.e., credit
- 3 card purchases where the most intimate credit
- 4 card purchases, wherever they are, are
- 5 immediately records, and what about -- and
- 6 they'll think of five others -- I can only
- 7 think of one or two, but, believe me, the legal
- 8 profession and those interested in this
- 9 understand it very well.
- 10 So where are we going? Is this the
- 11 right line? How do we, in fact, write it?
- 12 Not, you see, for location. I have less
- 13 trouble with that. But where is it going? Can
- 14 you say -- it's a very open question, but I'm
- 15 very interested in your reactions.
- 16 MR. WESSLER: Justice Breyer, I think
- in -- in future cases in the lower courts and
- 18 perhaps back before Your Honors, it would be
- 19 relatively straightforward to define discrete
- 20 categories of information that may be
- 21 protected.
- I think perhaps certain other types of
- location records, information about the state
- of the body, like heart rate data from a smart
- 25 watch, or fertility tracking data from a

- 1 smartphone app, information about the interior
- of a home, for example, from a smart thermostat
- 3 that knows when the homeowner is at home and
- 4 perhaps what room they're in, communicative
- 5 contents, not only the contents of e-mails but
- 6 I think search queries to Google, not every
- 7 record will or should be protected, and I think
- 8 it is totally consistent with the role of the
- 9 lower courts to take an interpretive principle
- 10 from this Court and begin to apply it and over
- 11 time --
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: One --
- MR. WESSLER: -- clarity will emerge.
- JUSTICE BREYER: You want to add one
- 15 --
- 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: One thing --
- 17 I'm sorry. Please.
- JUSTICE BREYER: Maybe you want to add
- one thing, because I suspect you'll hear in a
- 20 minute that all the imperfections of Miller,
- 21 given your answer, and I'm thinking, too, I
- 22 quite agree with you, this is an open box. We
- 23 know not where we go. Unadministrable, et
- 24 cetera.
- 25 Anything else you want to add?

1 MR. WESSLER: Well, Your Honor, lower 2 courts have been struggling mightily to apply Miller and Smith to highly sensitive digital 3 age records. 4 5 And as to these historical location 6 records, the five courts of appeals to address this have generated 20 majority concurring and 7 dissenting opinions, many of them virtually 8 9 begging this Court to provide guidance for how to protect these sensitive digital records that 10 the Court simply could not have imagined four 11 12 decades ago. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: A lot of what 13 you're talking about and a lot of what the 14 questions concern, I think, is addressed under 15 16 the question whether a warrant should issue as 17 opposed to whether a warrant is required. 18 Under current practice, when you're getting a warrant, it makes a difference if you 19 go in and say I want to search the entire house 2.0 for anything I can find and if you say I want 21 to search the drawers for business records that 2.2 we think are related to blah, blah, blah. 23 24 And so it's the same thing here. Yes, the technology affects every aspect of -- of 25

- 1 life. That doesn't mean that the warrant has
- 2 to. And in terms of reasonableness, if you can
- 3 focus on, you know, we want to talk about
- 4 simply whatever it is, purchases, because we
- 5 have reason to believe he's purchasing the
- 6 stuff that goes in to make, you know,
- 7 methamphetamine, but that doesn't mean we're
- 8 going to go look at location information.
- 9 MR. WESSLER: Your Honor, we certainly
- 10 think that the -- the probable cause and
- 11 particularity requirements of a warrant will --
- 12 will do a lot of work to -- to focus
- investigations.
- In an investigation like this, perhaps
- 15 127 days or 152, as the original request was,
- 16 would not all be appropriate. Maybe under a
- warrant a two or three-day span around each of
- the robberies would actually be particularly
- 19 relevant to the probable cause determination.
- 20 But -- but our basic submission is
- 21 that a warrant is required in this context
- 22 because it's unlike the other subpoena cases
- 23 that the government has identified. In the
- 24 normal subpoena case, this Court has identified
- 25 two factors that weigh on -- on the

- 1 reasonableness categorically of subpoenas:
- 2 first that the recipient complies with it, they
- 3 -- they select the responsive records and
- 4 provide them to the government, which is --
- 5 poses less of a risk of -- of abuse, and,
- 6 second, that there is notice and an opportunity
- 7 for pre-compliance review.
- Neither of those obtained here, where
- 9 the subpoena goes to a third-party, but the
- 10 subject of the investigation receives no notice
- 11 and has no opportunity to --
- 12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Can you tell me
- what is the difference between the 2703(d)
- order and warrant? What are situations where
- 15 you could get the order but not a warrant?
- 16 MR. WESSLER: So the -- the standard
- 17 for issuance of the order is lower. Some lower
- 18 courts have likened it to a reasonable
- 19 suspicion standard. I think it's probably a
- 20 touch above pure reasonableness, but it's
- 21 certainly short of probable cause.
- 22 It also lacks a requirement for a
- 23 sworn statement. There's no affidavit. It's
- 24 -- it's placed before a magistrate judge by a
- 25 prosecutor.

1 And it lacks a particularity requirement, which has led in -- in cases to 2 extraordinarily broad requests. We identify in 3 our reply brief one case where the government 4 obtained 454 days of historical location data 5 6 for one defendant, 388 for another. You have 127 days here, 221 days in 7 Graham from the Fourth Circuit, with a cert 8 9 petition currently pending. That is a quite extraordinary amount of time. 10 If I could, I'd like to reserve the 11 12 balance of my time. JUSTICE GORSUCH: Mr. Wessler, I'm 13 sorry, one quick question. Focusing on the 14 property-based approach, putting aside 15 16 reasonable expectation for just a moment, what 17 do we know about what state law would say about this information? 18 19 So say -- say a thief broke into T Mobile, stole this information and sought to 20 make economic value of it. Would you have a 21 conversion -- would your client have a 22 23 conversion claim, for example, under state law? Have you explored that at all? 24 25 MR. WESSLER: So I -- I think it's

- 1 possible. And I think conversion is the -- the
- 2 closest --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Uh-huh.
- 4 MR. WESSLER: -- sort of tort analog
- 5 to what we have here. But we -- we placed the
- 6 source of the property right here in federal
- 7 law, not state law.
- 8 JUSTICE GORSUCH: No, I understand
- 9 222. I've got that argument. I am just
- 10 wondering have you -- have state courts
- 11 developed this at all?
- MR. WESSLER: State -- state courts
- have not, to my knowledge. I think in roughly
- 14 analogous contexts, like trade secrets --
- 15 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Right.
- 16 MR. WESSLER: -- certainly conversion
- 17 applies --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Right.
- 19 MR. WESSLER: -- but not directly
- 20 here.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. Thank you.
- MR. WESSLER: Thank you.
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- counsel.
- Mr. Dreeben.

| 1 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. DREEBEN |
|----|---|
| 2 | ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT |
| 3 | MR. DREEBEN: Mr. Chief Justice, and |
| 4 | may it please the Court: |
| 5 | The technology here is new, but the |
| 6 | legal principles that this Court has |
| 7 | articulated under the Fourth Amendment are not. |
| 8 | The cell phone companies in this case |
| 9 | function essentially as witnesses being asked |
| LO | to produce business records of their own |
| L1 | transactions with customers. |
| L2 | The cell systems cannot function |
| L3 | without information about where the phones are |
| L4 | located. Anyone who subscribes to a cell phone |
| L5 | service will communicate that information to |
| L6 | towers in order to receive calls. The cell |
| L7 | phone companies get that information to operate |
| L8 | the cell network. They choose to make their |
| L9 | own business records of that information. It's |
| 20 | not a government mandate. |
| 21 | They make decisions based on their own |
| 22 | business needs about what they're going to |
| 23 | retain. And when the government comes and asks |
| 24 | them to produce it, it is doing the same thing |
| 25 | that it did in Smith |

- 1 thing that it did in Miller. It is asking a
- 2 business to provide information about the
- 3 business's own transactions with a customer.
- 4 And under the third-party doctrine,
- 5 that does not implicate the Fourth Amendment
- 6 rights of the customer.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But asking --
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: This is not
- 9 simply created by the company, though. It's a
- joint venture with the individual carrying the
- 11 phone. That person helps the company create
- 12 the record by being there and sending out the
- 13 pings or whatever.
- MR. DREEBEN: Well, that's certainly
- true, but it's no less true in Smith and
- 16 Miller. In order for the phone company to have
- 17 a record of who a person called, the person has
- 18 to make the call. The information goes to the
- 19 phone company. The phone company uses that
- 20 information to route the call.
- 21 Here, the cell phone provider gets
- information from the phone about where the
- 23 phone is so that it can route calls to the
- 24 phone and that it can route calls from the
- 25 phone.

- 1 That's just the basic technological
- 2 nature of cell phones, but it doesn't differ in
- 3 principle from what was going on in Smith. And
- 4 you could say the same thing about Miller.
- 5 Somebody has to engage in banking
- 6 transactions through a bank. They write a
- 7 check. They give the check to the bank. The
- 8 bank uses it to carry out the bank's business.
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, they don't
- 10 give it to the bank. They give it to a person,
- 11 who gives it to the bank. It's a big
- 12 difference.
- MR. DREEBEN: Well, Justice Sotomayor,
- 14 I think that there are a zillion different ways
- 15 to carry out financial transactions, including
- some that involve giving a check to a person.
- 17 Many involve going to the bank directly and
- 18 having the bank conduct the financial
- 19 transaction.
- 20 Anybody who writes a check understands
- 21 that the check will be submitted to the bank so
- that the bank can pay.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Dreeben, why
- is it not okay, in the way we said about
- beepers, to plant a beeper in somebody's

- 1 bedroom, but it's okay to get the cell phone
- 2 records of someone who I -- I don't, but I know
- 3 that most young people have the phones in the
- 4 bed with them.
- 5 (Laughter.)
- 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right? I know
- 7 people who take phones into public restrooms.
- 8 They take them with them everywhere. It's an
- 9 appendage now for some people.
- If it's not okay to put a beeper into
- 11 someone's bedroom, why is it okay to use the
- 12 signals that phone is using from that person's
- bedroom, made accessible to law enforcement
- 14 without probable cause?
- 15 MR. DREEBEN: So, Justice Sotomayor, I
- will answer the question about cell phone
- 17 location in a house, but I think it's important
- 18 that the Court understand that this case
- involves very generalized cell sector
- 20 information --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's today, Mr.
- Dreeben, but we need to look at this with
- 23 respect to how the technology is developing.
- MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think Justice
- 25 Sotomayor --

| 1 | JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We can leave |
|----|---|
| 2 | phones in a bedroom now. |
| 3 | MR. DREEBEN: You you well, |
| 4 | there's a distinction between acquiring GPS |
| 5 | information from a phone and acquiring cell |
| 6 | site information from a business. This case |
| 7 | involves acquiring cell site information from a |
| 8 | business. It's a wide area. Our brief |
| 9 | attempted to illustrate how in Detroit |
| 10 | JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, this is no |
| 11 | different than a telephone company having |
| 12 | access to your telephone conversations. But we |
| 13 | protected those in Smith. |
| 14 | MR. DREEBEN: No, I think it's it's |
| 15 | very different from it. The expectations of |
| 16 | privacy about the contents of a one-to-one |
| 17 | communication or a one-to-many communication |
| 18 | are quite different. They grow out of the |
| 19 | bedrock understanding that a letter mailed |
| 20 | through the mail, the routing information is |
| 21 | available to the government, the address of |
| 22 | where it's going |
| 23 | JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yeah, but but |
| 24 | an in an envelope, you seal the envelope. |
| 25 | You can you can yourself control the public |

- 1 disclosure.
- 2 But with telephones, the telephone
- 3 company could have plugged in and listened to
- 4 your conversation just as easily as these
- 5 telecommunications companies can read your
- 6 e-mails if they choose. Yet, we've said we
- 7 would protect e-mail content.
- 8 MR. DREEBEN: That is true. And I
- 9 think that that is because there is a
- 10 difference between content and routing
- information that the Court recognized in Smith
- 12 itself.
- We're dealing here with routing
- 14 information. We're not dealing with the
- 15 contents of communications. I agree with you
- 16 that Katz makes clear that incidental access of
- a provider to the contents of a communication
- 18 when the -- when the provider is functioning as
- 19 an intermediary doesn't vitiate Fourth
- 20 Amendment protection.
- We're not here to argue that it does.
- We're here to argue that routing information of
- 23 the sort that was available in Smith and the
- 24 sort that's available here functions as a
- 25 business record because the business is using

- 1 it in its transaction with the customer to
- 2 route the calls.
- 3 The content information is being
- 4 provided through a provider as an intermediary
- 5 so that somebody can communicate with another
- 6 person. And --
- 7 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Dreeben, how is
- 8 this different from Jones? You know, in Jones,
- 9 there were a couple of different opinions, but
- 10 five justices, as -- as I count it, said
- 11 this -- this is from Justice Alito's opinion:
- 12 "Society's expectation has been that law
- 13 enforcement and others would not, and indeed in
- 14 the main simply cannot, monitor and catalogue
- 15 every single movement of an individual's" --
- 16 there it was a car -- "for a long period."
- 17 So how is it different from that?
- 18 MR. DREEBEN: I think it's
- 19 fundamentally different, Justice Kagan, because
- 20 this involves acquiring the business records of
- 21 a provider which has determined to keep these
- 22 records of the cell site information.
- Jones involved government
- 24 surveillance. It involved attaching a GPS
- 25 device to the car. Five members of the Court

- 1 regarded that as a trespatory search. Five
- 2 other members of the Court were prepared to
- 3 analyze that under reasonable expectations of
- 4 privacy. But in both cases, it was direct
- 5 surveillance of the suspect in the crime.
- 6 JUSTICE KAGAN: So the question is why
- 7 that should make more of a difference than the
- 8 obvious similarity between this case and Jones?
- 9 And the obvious similarity is that, in both
- 10 cases, you have reliance on a new technology
- 11 that allows for 24/7 tracking.
- Now, you're exactly right, there were
- different means, but in both cases, you have a
- 14 new technology that allows for 24/7 tracking
- and a conclusion by a number of justices in
- Jones that that was an altogether new and
- different thing that did intrude on people's
- 18 expectations of who would be watching them
- 19 when.
- MR. DREEBEN: So the -- the people who
- 21 are watching in this case are the phone
- 22 companies because people have decided to sign
- 23 up for cellular service in which it is a
- 24 necessity of the service that your phone
- 25 communicate with a tower and a business record

- 1 is generated.
- 2 People who dial phone numbers on calls
- 3 know that they're being routed through a cell
- 4 phone or a landline provider. Those records
- 5 can be made available to the government. They
- 6 could be made available for quite extensive
- 7 periods of time.
- I think in many ways it's far more
- 9 revealing to know who a person is calling than
- 10 to know the generalized cell sector where their
- 11 phone is located. The cell site information
- doesn't tell you the person was with the phone;
- 13 it doesn't tell you --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Dreeben, what
- do you do with the survey mentioned by your
- opposing colleague that says that most
- 17 Americans, I still think, want to avoid Big
- 18 Brother. They want to avoid the concept that
- 19 government will be able to see and locate you
- 20 anywhere you are at any point in time.
- Is it -- do you really believe that
- 22 people expect that the government will be able
- 23 to do that without probable cause and a
- 24 warrant?
- MR. DREEBEN: I don't --

| 1 | JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The the |
|----|---|
| 2 | Constitution protects the rights of people to |
| 3 | be secure. Isn't it a fundamental concept, |
| 4 | don't you think, that that would include the |
| 5 | government searching for information about your |
| 6 | location every second of the day |
| 7 | MR. DREEBEN: So in instances like |
| 8 | this, Justice Sotomayor |
| 9 | JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: for months and |
| 10 | months at a time? |
| 11 | MR. DREEBEN: involving rapidly |
| 12 | changing technology and privacy expectations |
| 13 | that are being measured here by surveys, the |
| 14 | proper body to address that is Congress. |
| 15 | And Congress has been active in this |
| 16 | area. This is not an instance of political |
| 17 | failure |
| 18 | JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, the question |
| 19 | is, was it the fact that Congress recognized |
| 20 | how sensitive this information is, is quite |
| 21 | laudatory, but did it understand the measure of |
| 22 | the constitutional requirement of what |
| 23 | protections should be given to that? |
| 24 | I mean, I I can defer to Congress's |
| 25 | understanding of the privacy needs, but does |

- 1 that create an obligation for me to defer to
- 2 their judgment of what protections the
- 3 Constitution requires?
- 4 The Constitution has always said
- 5 government can't intrude, except in some
- 6 carefully defined situation, special needs
- 7 being foremost among them -- can't intrude on
- 8 those privacy interests without a warrant.
- 9 We're not saying they can't ever. They've just
- 10 got to have articulable facts based on reliable
- information, sworn to in an affidavit, that can
- 12 provide probable cause to believe that this
- individual is involved in criminal activity.
- 14 That's not a new standard. That's an
- 15 old standard.
- 16 MR. DREEBEN: But the new standard
- 17 here would be saying that the business records
- of a third party, when acquired by the
- 19 government, constitute a --
- 20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But we have --
- MR. DREEBEN: -- search of --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- we have said --
- you know, we have made exceptions all the time,
- 24 Ferguson, Bond, even in creating Smith and
- 25 Miller, we created an exception. People

- 1 disclose the content of telephone calls to
- 2 third parties. But we said the government
- 3 can't intrude without a warrant in that
- 4 situation.
- 5 MR. DREEBEN: I think there was a
- 6 well-developed framework at the time of Smith
- 7 and Miller that the Court applied to Smith and
- 8 Miller. And it basically says, in our society,
- 9 if you communicate information to a third
- 10 person, the public has an interest in that
- 11 person's witnessing of what they heard or what
- 12 they said, and it can acquire it through means
- 13 short of a warrant.
- 14 That was the basic framework that led
- the Court in Katz to conclude that what you
- 16 maintain privately in your house or in the
- 17 content of your phone calls requires special
- 18 process.
- 19 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Mr. Dreeben, I'd
- 20 like to -- I'd like to drill down on that and
- 21 return to Justice Kagan's question. You know,
- the facts here wind up looking a lot like
- Jones.
- One thing Jones taught us is -- and
- reminded us, really, is that the property-based

approach to privacy also has to be considered, 1 2 not just the reasonable expectation approach. 3 So, if we put aside the reasonable expectation approach for just a moment, Katz, 4 5 Miller, Smith, and ask what is the property 6 right here, let's say there is a property 7 right. Let's say I have a property right in the conversion case I posited with your 8 9 colleague. so that if someone were to steal my 10 location information from T-Mobile I'd have a 11 12 conversion claim, for example, against them for the economic value that was stolen. 13 14 Wouldn't that, therefore, be a search of my paper or effect under the property-based 15 16 approach approved and reminded us in Jones? 17 MR. DREEBEN: I suppose that if you are insisting that I acknowledge that it's a 18 19 property right, some consequences are going to 20 follow --JUSTICE GORSUCH: Right. 21 22 MR. DREEBEN: -- from that. 23 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay.

MR. DREEBEN: I don't think you can --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: But let's just --

24

```
1 let's --
```

- 2 MR. DREEBEN: I don't think you can
- 3 make that assumption.
- 4 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- let's stick with
- 5 my hypothetical, counsel, okay? I know you
- 6 don't like it. I got that.
- 7 (Laughter.)
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: But let's say that,
- 9 in fact, I've got positive law that indicates
- 10 it is a property right. Would you there,
- 11 therefore, agree that that's a search of my
- 12 paper and effect?
- MR. DREEBEN: I wouldn't, and I --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: But why not?
- MR. DREEBEN: Because it's not your
- 16 paper or your effect.
- 17 JUSTICE GORSUCH: If property law says
- 18 it is.
- MR. DREEBEN: Well, I don't think
- 20 property law does say that it is. And I
- 21 think that --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, that's
- 23 fighting the hypothetical, counsel. And I know
- 24 I -- I didn't like hypotheticals, too, when I
- 25 was a lawyer sometimes, but I'm asking you to

- 1 stick with my hypothetical.
- 2 MR. DREEBEN: Justice Gorsuch, I think
- 3 that the problem with the hypothetical is that
- 4 it creates a property interest out of transfers
- 5 of information.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Please -- please,
- 7 could you stick with my hypothetical and then
- 8 you can tell me why it's wrong.
- 9 MR. DREEBEN: All right.
- 10 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Under my
- 11 hypothetical, you have a property right in this
- 12 information.
- Would it be a search of my paper and
- 14 effect? Yes or no.
- 15 MR. DREEBEN: I am not sure. And the
- 16 reason that I am not sure is there has never
- been a property right recognized in information
- 18 that's conveyed to a business of this
- 19 character.
- If we were talking about e-mail, as
- 21 Your Honor's opinion in Ackerman sought to
- 22 analogize to property, I think we would have a
- 23 more complex discussion about it. I'm not sure
- that it would achieve any different result.
- 25 JUSTICE GORSUCH: You're not here to

- deny that there might be a property interest
- 2 and, therefore, a search?
- 3 MR. DREEBEN: No, I am -- I'm here to
- 4 deny there's a property interest in cell site
- 5 information about e-mail --
- 6 JUSTICE GORSUCH: In my -- in my
- 7 hypothetical, if there were a property
- 8 interest, you're not here to deny that that
- 9 would be a search of my paper and effect?
- 10 MR. DREEBEN: I'm not here to concede
- 11 it either.
- 12 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay.
- MR. DREEBEN: And the reason that --
- 14 (Laughter.)
- 15 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay.
- MR. DREEBEN: The reason that I can't
- 17 concede it is it's a property right that
- 18 resembles no property right that's existed.
- 19 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I think you --
- JUSTICE ALITO: Yeah, Mr. Dreeben,
- 21 along those lines, I was trying to think of an
- 22 example of a situation in which a person would
- 23 have a property right in information that the
- person doesn't ask a third-party to create, the
- 25 person can't force the third-party to create it

- or to gather it. The person can't prevent the
- 2 company from gathering it. The person can't
- 3 force the company to destroy it. The person
- 4 can't prevent the company from destroying it.
- 5 And according to Petitioner, the
- 6 customer doesn't even have a right to get the
- 7 information.
- 8 MR. DREEBEN: So, Justice Alito, those
- 9 are a lot of good reasons on why this should
- 10 not be recognized as a property interest. I
- 11 can't think of anything that would be
- 12 characterized as a property interest with those
- 13 traits. And it would be a -- really a
- 14 watershed change in the law to treat
- 15 transferred information as property.
- 16 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, what does
- 17 Section 222 do, other than declare this
- 18 customer proprietary network information --
- MR. DREEBEN: So that --
- 20 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- that the carrier
- 21 cannot disclose?
- MR. DREEBEN: It -- it does that in
- 23 conjunction with a provision that it shall be
- 24 disclosed as required by law.
- 25 JUSTICE GORSUCH: So -- so, let me ask

- 1 you that. So -- so the government can
- 2 acknowledge a property right but then strip it
- 3 of any Fourth Amendment protection. Is that
- 4 the government's position?
- 5 MR. DREEBEN: No, no, but I think that
- 6 the --
- 7 JUSTICE GORSUCH: And so -- so could
- 8 we also say maybe that they also get this
- 9 property right subject to having a non-Article
- 10 III judge decide the case, or quartering of
- 11 troops in your home? Could we strip your
- 12 property interests of all constitutional
- 13 protection?
- MR. DREEBEN: Well, those are pretty
- 15 far afield. I -- I think what's going on
- 16 here --
- 17 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Are they?
- 18 MR. DREEBEN: -- is that Congress has
- 19 set up a regime to protect privacy interests in
- 20 information. I think this is also an
- 21 illustration of why this Court does not have to
- leap ahead with the Fourth Amendment to
- 23 constitutionalize interests in property.
- 24 And Congress has calibrated under what
- 25 circumstances that privacy interest shall be

- 1 protected. It yields in the face of legal
- 2 statutes that Congress has also passed --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: But does Congress's
- 4 determination also yield in the face of the
- 5 Fourth Amendment, Mr. Dreeben?
- 6 MR. DREEBEN: It does not.
- 7 JUSTICE GORSUCH: It does not. The
- 8 Fourth Amendment is trumped by this statute?
- 9 MR. DREEBEN: But what interests the
- 10 statute --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: In the government's
- 12 -- in the government's view. Is that -- is
- 13 that right? The statute trumps the Fourth
- 14 Amendment?
- 15 MR. DREEBEN: I think I said the
- 16 opposite.
- 17 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Oh, good. All
- 18 right. I hoped so.
- 19 MR. DREEBEN: So I think we're on
- 20 common ground that the Fourth --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: So the Fourth
- 22 Amendment controls, not -- not what the statute
- 23 says --
- MR. DREEBEN: Well --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- with respect to

- the disclosure of the information?
- 2 MR. DREEBEN: -- the Fourth Amendment
- 3 applies once the Court has identified what
- 4 interest the statute creates.
- 5 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Right. The statute
- 6 creates customer proprietary information --
- 7 MR. DREEBEN: Well, it --
- 8 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- in Section 222
- 9 and then the Fourth Amendment will determine
- 10 when it can be revealed. Right?
- MR. DREEBEN: No. The statute
- 12 actually creates --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Why does the statute
- 14 control the Constitution? I think you are
- 15 saying the statute controls the Constitution.
- 16 MR. DREEBEN: No, I think that the
- interests that the statute creates have to be
- 18 looked at as a whole. And this Court has been
- 19 very careful to --
- 20 JUSTICE GORSUCH: So the bitter -- the
- 21 bitter with the sweet.
- MR. DREEBEN: Yeah, I know the Court
- has rejected that in the due process context,
- 24 but here we are looking at what interests
- 25 Congress has sought to protect and --

| 1 | JUSTICE GORSUCH: So why why why |
|----|---|
| 2 | couldn't Congress also say you don't get an |
| 3 | Article III judge to determine this issue? |
| 4 | MR. DREEBEN: That seems so |
| 5 | non-germane to what Congress was trying to do. |
| 6 | In Section 222, what Congress was trying to do |
| 7 | was to say, look, the the companies are |
| 8 | collecting a large amount of information. |
| 9 | We recognize that there are privacy |
| 10 | interests in this. We want to give recognition |
| 11 | to those privacy interests. We do not want to |
| 12 | hamper legitimate law enforcement. So the |
| 13 | interests |
| 14 | JUSTICE ALITO: Yeah, Mr. Dreeben, I |
| 15 | would read the the the phrase "customer |
| 16 | proprietary information" to mean that it is |
| 17 | proprietary to the cell phone company and, |
| 18 | therefore, not to the customer. It's customer |
| 19 | information, but it's proprietary information |
| 20 | about the cell phone company because, if you |
| 21 | got that information in the aggregate, you |
| 22 | could tell a lot about the company's operation. |
| 23 | I assume that that that kind of |
| 24 | information would be available to the FCC. And |
| 25 | so, if the FCC obtained it, they would have to |

1 treat it as proprietary information of the

61

| 2 | company. |
|----|---|
| 3 | MR. DREEBEN: Justice Alito |
| 4 | JUSTICE ALITO: Am I wrong in that? |
| 5 | MR. DREEBEN: I am not sure that that |
| 6 | is the way that Congress intended it, but I |
| 7 | think that what is significant is not the label |
| 8 | but what actual underlying rights were created. |
| 9 | JUSTICE ALITO: Well, if it were |
| 10 | proprietary to the customer, in what sense is |
| 11 | it proprietary to the customer, since it has |
| 12 | all of those attributes that I mentioned? |
| 13 | MR. DREEBEN: That's precisely my |
| 14 | point. As a label to indicate that Congress |
| 15 | wanted to show some respect for privacy |
| 16 | interests, when people interact with |
| 17 | telecommunications companies, it provided |
| 18 | certain nondisclosure rules. |
| 19 | It also made clear that it |
| 20 | JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could the |
| 21 | government say to telecommunications providers |
| 22 | you cannot use this kind of information, you |
| 23 | can't keep it? |
| 24 | MR. DREEBEN: Yes, I'm sure that in |
| 25 | regulating that telephone companies are given a |

- 1 broad range.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what's the
- difference between that and saying, if you want
- 4 to create this information, you are taking this
- 5 information from customers and it's the
- 6 customer's information? You can't disclose it
- 7 without the customer saying yeah or nay.
- 8 MR. DREEBEN: Congress --
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Isn't what that
- 10 Congress did?
- MR. DREEBEN: No, because Congress
- 12 provided that it shall be disclosed as required
- 13 by law. And the same Congress has passed --
- 14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, but then we
- 15 -- then you're begging the question, which is
- 16 Justice Gorsuch's question, which is what's the
- 17 -- what does the law, the Fourth Amendment,
- 18 require in those circumstances?
- 19 MR. DREEBEN: So this Court has been
- 20 --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You're saying
- 22 Congress can set the level of what the
- 23 Constitution requires, but I don't know that
- 24 that's true.
- MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think it's

- 1 definitely not true. This Court is the arbiter
- of the Fourth Amendment, but it has already
- 3 decided that question.
- It has decided two things: One, under
- 5 the third-party doctrine, business information
- 6 that is obtained from a company in the ordinary
- 7 course of its business is not a search of the
- 8 customer.
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But that's begging
- 10 the question. Is it the third-party's
- information when Congress says it's customer
- 12 information?
- MR. DREEBEN: Well, Congress can say a
- lot of things, and I think that the important
- thing that this Court has said as a corollary
- 16 to my point about what the third-party doctrine
- 17 is, is the Court has made clear that state laws
- 18 that provide additional enhanced privacy
- 19 protection do not alter Fourth Amendment
- 20 baselines.
- 21 It said that in Greenwood. It said
- that in Moore. It said it most recently in
- 23 Quon, where it confronted a claim that the
- 24 Stored Communications Act, the same law that's
- 25 at issue here, created some sort of an

- 1 expectation of privacy above and beyond what
- the Fourth Amendment required, and the Court
- 3 said: We don't measure Fourth Amendment rules
- 4 about privacy expectations in text messaging by
- 5 what Congress has provided in the context of
- 6 the Stored Communications Act.
- 7 And I think it, in fact, illustrates
- 8 that Congress's efforts to provide enhanced
- 9 protection above and beyond what the Fourth
- 10 Amendment requires do not alter the content of
- 11 the Fourth Amendment.
- 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. -- Mr. Dreeben,
- 13 can I --
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice --
- 15 Justice Breyer.
- JUSTICE BREYER: I just want your
- 17 reaction to what I asked the other side. I
- 18 agree with you that the law is at the moment
- 19 third-party information is third-party, with a
- few exceptions, but it may be that here another
- 21 exception should exist for the reason that the
- 22 technology, since the time those cases have --
- 23 has changed dramatically to the point where you
- 24 get cell phone information, the tower
- information, and put it together in a way that

- 1 tracks a person's movement for 274 days or
- whatever, is an unreasonable thing for the
- 3 government to do. Assume that's so.
- 4 Now, one thing that is bothering me
- 5 about that line is what I said before. I would
- 6 like your reaction as to how to draw such a
- 7 line, if we draw it.
- 8 MR. DREEBEN: So I don't think there
- 9 --
- 10 JUSTICE BREYER: Because -- wait,
- 11 there are other things, and I want to -- I'll
- 12 be very specific about them through. I said,
- and I didn't have much basis in your brief for
- 14 saying it, is it true that it's quite frequent
- or at least not abnormal for the government,
- 16 when faced with reason to believe that there
- 17 are securities violations, white-collar crime
- 18 violations, terrorism financing violations, all
- 19 kinds of things like that, that they do go to
- 20 banks and they do ask for purchase information
- or to the credit card companies, et cetera,
- 22 without a warrant, just reasonable? Now --
- MR. DREEBEN: Yes.
- 24 JUSTICE BREYER: -- therefore, you
- 25 don't want that interfered with.

MR. DREEBEN: No.

- 2 JUSTICE BREYER: No. But -- but it may not worry you so much that -- that they 3 can't track a person's physical, which is like 4 5 his body, you know, where it is, and the 6 technology has changed dramatically there. 7 maybe it's an unfair question to ask you --MR. DREEBEN: Well, I'd -- I'd --8 9 JUSTICE BREYER: -- but how would you draw that line because that's the problem 10 that's --11 12 MR. DREEBEN: I'm not going to draw, Justice Breyer --13 14 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How would -- how 15 16 would you like to lose? (Laughter.) 17
- 18 MR. DREEBEN: I do not think that -- I
- 19 don't think it can be drawn coherently --
- JUSTICE BREYER: Well, why not just
- 21 say what he said on the other side? Say what's
- 22 wrong with that? What we say is, look, what we
- have here is many, many days of the government
- taking previously unavailable tower information
- at the time of Miller, et cetera, now putting

- 1 it together in order to track where this human
- 2 being has been for a long period of time,
- 3 something that never could have been gotten
- 4 before, and to do that without some probable
- 5 cause is an unreasonable thing. What's wrong
- 6 with that as an exception welded onto the basic
- 7 rule?
- 8 MR. DREEBEN: It doesn't have a
- 9 coherent principle that will explain why a
- 10 similar rule shouldn't be applied to credit
- 11 card records or debit card records or records
- of one's travel through Uber or through a
- myriad of other kinds of digital records that
- 14 are created.
- 15 JUSTICE BREYER: Or, well, maybe it
- does have a principle. Maybe the principle is
- 17 that look at the exception they've made for
- 18 diagnostic hospital records. That is an
- 19 exception. And it has to do with physical
- 20 bodies, and it has to do with the private
- information related to those physical bodies.
- 22 And here, if, in fact, there are
- 23 similar things in similar circumstances of
- 24 highly private information, you draw, you know,
- 25 several -- you draw several factors there and

- 1 -- and you have it over here, if you had the
- 2 similar thing, all those factors are met in
- 3 these other cases, so be it.
- 4 MR. DREEBEN: So, Justice Breyer,
- 5 there is a significant difference between the
- 6 kinds of cases you're talking about involving
- 7 direct governmental searching activity and
- 8 governmental acquisition of information from
- 9 businesses.
- The government is not monitoring the
- 11 movements of this person by attaching a device
- 12 to their person or by surveilling them, an
- issue that I think itself raises difficult
- 14 questions since it does not appear that
- 15 Petitioner objects to tailing somebody in
- 16 multiple cars, even over 127 days.
- 17 What we're talking about here is the
- distinction between the government going and
- 19 getting information from an individual and the
- government going to a business and asking the
- 21 business to serve as a witness.
- 22 And I think Your Honor's point about
- 23 how investigations proceed is exactly right.
- 24 What the government does at the early stages of
- an investigation is reach out to third parties

- 1 because it may not have enough information
- 2 about whether a crime has been committed or
- 3 whether a particular individual is culpable for
- 4 that crime. It goes to third-party providers
- 5 who have information that allows them to narrow
- 6 the field, to find out what's going on.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: If there -- if
- 8 there's a shooting into a house, someone is
- 9 killed, and witnesses say the shooter was
- 10 running away with a cell phone, and the police
- 11 ask the company to release all information
- 12 about cell phones in that area, you don't have
- to go to the -- to get a 2703(d) order?
- MR. DREEBEN: No, we do have to get a
- 15 2703(d) order. And, in fact, we used that --
- 16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: You do even -- even
- 17 for --
- MR. DREEBEN: Yes.
- 19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- a blanket search?
- 20 MR. DREEBEN: Well, for -- I think
- 21 what Justice Sotomayor described earlier is
- 22 getting tower information. We used exactly
- that technique when a bullet was fired through
- 24 the window of a federal judge --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Right.

1 MR. DREEBEN: -- in Florida, and the government did not have a clear idea of who the 2 suspects would be. It attempted to narrow down 3 4 the field by figuring out --5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But you did need an 6 order? MR. DREEBEN: Yes, we did need an order and we got an order. And I think this is 8 9 another answer to your concern, Justice Breyer. Not only are we going to less sensitive sources 10 11 of information at the early stages of an 12 investigation to gather information and figure out what the criminal activity is and who might 13 be inculpated in it, but we also are operating 14 under a statutory regime that requires us to 15 16 make a particularized showing. 17 It's not the case that we can just 18 walk in and get --19 JUSTICE KAGAN: Right. But, Mr. Dreeben, that could go away tomorrow. 20 question here is the constitutional question, 21 22 not the statutory one. So can I take you back 23 to what, it seems to me, is the essential

Heritage Reporting Corporation

identity between the factual circumstances here

and in Jones, which is that the government is

24

- 1 getting 24/7 information.
- I mean, in some ways, you could say
- 3 this is more. Jones was just about a car; this
- 4 is about every place that you are, whether
- 5 you're in a car or not. And you said to me
- 6 that what makes it different is that you've
- 7 given the information to another person. But I
- 8 recall that when you were here in the Jones
- 9 case, your theory for why that was permissible
- 10 was essentially that you had given that
- information to the entire public; in other
- words, just by being in the world, everybody
- sees you, everybody watches you, and you've
- lost your expectation of privacy in that way.
- Now, we pretty conclusively rejected
- that argument. Why is it different when it's
- 17 giving it to one person, the same information,
- this 24/7 tracking, than we said it was when
- 19 you give it to the entire world?
- 20 MR. DREEBEN: So I think that it is
- 21 fundamentally different in the means that we
- 22 chose to employ in Jones versus this case, and
- 23 it's also different in what information we're
- 24 acquiring. We did not acquire, in this case,
- 25 24/7 tracking of the precise movements of an

- 1 individual everywhere he went. We acquired
- 2 information of the cell tower where a call
- 3 started --
- 4 JUSTICE KAGAN: But let's assume you
- 5 could. Let's assume Mr. Wessler is right that
- 6 the -- the technology keeps on getting better
- 7 and better, more and more precise, it's not 10
- 8 football fields anymore; it's half of this
- 9 courtroom. Next month, it may be an eighth of
- 10 this courtroom.
- 11 You know, so let's assume that we're
- 12 looking ahead just a little bit and it's pretty
- 13 precision-targeting.
- MR. DREEBEN: So I would say that the
- third-party doctrine doesn't change. I also
- 16 think that this Court could disagree and draw a
- 17 line on more precise information that involves
- 18 24/7 tracking.
- 19 This information is just simply far
- 20 more similar to what was going on in the Smith
- 21 case, where we got dialed phone numbers that
- 22 would reveal a much more precise location where
- 23 the dialed phone number came from and the
- 24 person that was being spoken to.
- This case does not present the Court

with the opportunity to decide the kind of 1 2 granularity that Petitioner posits may happen in the future. And if it does happen in --3 JUSTICE KAGAN: Would it be 4 5 permissible for the government to ask a cell 6 phone company for lifetime information? 7 MR. DREEBEN: Not under the current statutory regime and --8 9 JUSTICE KAGAN: No, under your view of the Constitution. 10 MR. DREEBEN: I think it would be 11 12 highly questionable under the Constitution, and here's why: Providers, which are hardly shy 13 14 about asserting Fourth Amendment rights, have protections against unduly broad subpoenas that 15 16 this Court has recognized in a line of cases 17 summed up in Donovan versus Lone Steer and summarized in our -- in our brief. There has 18 19 to be a showing of --2.0 JUSTICE KAGAN: Where is the line? MR. DREEBEN: There has to be a 2.1 showing of relevance. There has to be a 22 23 showing of congressional authorization. has to be a showing of specificity. And it 24 cannot be unduly broad so as to be unduly 25

- 1 burdensome. So the --
- 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, all
- 3 those protections are available in the
- 4 magistrate's decision whether to issue the
- 5 warrant, right? I -- I mean, you can --
- MR. DREEBEN: Yes. But -- but we --
- 7 we have to demand this information somehow. If
- 8 we assume that the statute went away, which for
- 9 reasons that I'd like to come back to, I think
- 10 the Court could decide the case based on the
- 11 statute's compliance with the Constitution,
- 12 even if you assume that there's a privacy
- interest at stake, but if there's no statute
- and we're going just under a subpoena, there is
- 15 a long-standing recognition in this Court's
- 16 cases that unduly broad subpoenas are subject
- to being squashed -- quashed under Fourth
- 18 Amendment principles.
- 19 And the principles that are considered
- in that context are raised by the provider.
- 21 They can include the sensitivity of the
- 22 information. This Court, in Footnote 6 of the
- 23 Miller decision, expressly said: Look, we
- 24 understand there's a lot of sensitive banking
- information that's going on here. There are

- 1 other protections besides abolishing the
- 2 third-party doctrine. They include the First
- 3 Amendment and they include objections to the
- 4 overbreadth of a request.
- 5 So, in response to your question,
- 6 could the government just walk in with a
- 7 subpoena and get a lifetime of this
- 8 information, no, I don't think that we could,
- 9 and I do not think that we would.
- 10 We are still limited by basic Fourth
- 11 Amendment principles that apply even to
- 12 subpoenas where there's not additional
- 13 statutory protection.
- JUSTICE ALITO: Now, yeah, Mr.
- 15 Dreeben, in order to understand the issue here
- and to see the difference between this case and
- Jones, isn't it necessary to go back to old
- 18 Supreme Court cases that describe -- that
- 19 explain how the Fourth Amendment applies to a
- 20 subpoena?
- 21 Asking another -- asking a party or
- 22 ordering a party to produce documents is not a
- 23 search in the literal sense of the word, nor is
- it a seizure in the literal sense of the word,
- but cases going back to Boyd, and Hale versus

- 1 Henkel, old cases say that it's a -- it's a
- 2 constructive search, but in the situation where
- 3 there's this constructive search, then the
- 4 Fourth Amendment standards that apply to a
- 5 literal search, what the Court called an actual
- 6 search, are different. Isn't that -- so it's a
- 7 fundamentally --
- 8 MR. DREEBEN: Yes.
- 9 JUSTICE ALITO: -- different
- 10 framework.
- MR. DREEBEN: It is a completely
- 12 different framework because of both a lesser
- degree of intrusion, because the government is
- 14 not going in itself and conducting search
- activity, and because there's an opportunity
- 16 for pre-compliance judicial review.
- 17 JUSTICE BREYER: Right. And maybe
- 18 you've got the answer to -- right there. You
- 19 say how do we distinguish this case from all
- 20 the cases where you wanted to get the
- 21 commercial information.
- In respect to the commercial
- information, banking and, you know, all the
- things for white-collar crime, it's commercial
- information. And you have the subpoenas and

1 you can perhaps have the protections there that

- 2 -- that you were talking about here, but this
- 3 is highly personal information on a -- on a
- 4 line, you say, it's somewhat closer to the
- 5 diagnostic testing than it is to purely
- 6 commercial information.
- 7 Now, I could imagine writing a
- 8 paragraph like that and saying leaving the
- 9 other for the future. Does that work or does
- 10 --
- 11 MR. DREEBEN: No. It --
- JUSTICE BREYER: Now, I know you'd say
- 13 no --
- MR. DREEBEN: It doesn't -- doesn't
- 15 work.
- 16 JUSTICE BREYER: -- but I need to know
- 17 the reason.
- MR. DREEBEN: Well, let me -- the
- 19 basic principle here in the Fourth Amendment is
- 20 how the government acquires information
- 21 matters, not the sensitivity of the
- 22 information.
- I have to disagree, Justice Breyer,
- that medical information is given heightened
- 25 protection under the Fourth Amendment. This --

1 JUSTICE BREYER: But the diagnostic --

- 2 the diagnostic test to the hospital.
- MR. DREEBEN: Well, no. The Ferguson
- 4 case, which I think --
- JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah.
- 6 MR. DREEBEN: -- you're referring
- 7 to --
- 8 JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah, I am.
- 9 MR. DREEBEN: -- involved a compelled
- search by the government, a urine test that the
- 11 Court assumed was given without informed
- 12 consent, so it was a government search by
- government hospital personnel that acquired the
- 14 urine --
- 15 JUSTICE BREYER: All right.
- 16 MR. DREEBEN: -- for law enforcement
- 17 purposes. That's the government search. I
- think this also answers Justice Sotomayor's
- 19 question about acquiring GPS information under
- 20 E911 from a handset. The government reaches
- into the phone, pulls out information. That, I
- 22 would concede, is a search.
- What we're doing here is not going to
- the individual and extracting information from
- 25 him. We're getting information from a

- 1 third-party provider, relying on the line of
- 2 cases that Justice Alito alluded to, that allow
- 3 us to use subpoenas.
- 4 JUSTICE KAGAN: But -- but, Mr.
- 5 Dreeben, that line of cases was developed in a
- 6 period in which third parties did not have this
- 7 kind of information, valid --
- 8 MR. DREEBEN: Not this kind
- 9 specifically, Justice Kagan, but in the
- 10 dissenting opinion in Smith, Justice Stewart
- warned that you're getting incredibly intimate
- information when you get the phone numbers of
- 13 people who you have called.
- 14 And I would submit that if the Court
- thinks about it, the information you get if you
- 16 know who you are calling and the inferences you
- 17 can draw about what kinds of conversations
- 18 people are having are extremely sensitive with
- 19 --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah, but if --
- MR. DREEBEN: -- dialed phone numbers.
- 22 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- I understand what
- you're saying, you're basically saying, well,
- 24 because the government is going to a
- third-party here and doing it by subpoena, it

- 1 doesn't matter how sensitive the information
- is. It doesn't matter whether there's really a
- 3 lack of voluntariness on the individual's part
- 4 in terms of conveying that information to the
- 5 third-party.
- And we could go on and we could give,
- you know, other factors that you might think in
- 8 a sensible world would matter to this question.
- 9 And you're saying that all of that is trumped
- 10 by the fact that the government is doing this
- 11 by subpoena, rather than by setting up its own
- 12 cell towers.
- 13 MR. DREEBEN: I don't think I did say
- 14 that, Justice Kagan, because there is an
- 15 element here of voluntariness in deciding to
- 16 contract with a cell company, just like there's
- 17 an element of voluntariness in getting a
- 18 landline phone and making calls, and there's an
- 19 element of voluntariness in signing up for a
- 20 bank account and using a debit card to purchase
- 21 --
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That --
- MR. DREEBEN: -- everything in your
- 24 life.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- that sounds

```
1 inconsistent with our decision in Riley,
```

- though, which emphasized that you really don't
- 3 have a choice these days if you want to have a
- 4 cell phone.
- 5 MR. DREEBEN: Well, and not -- not in
- 6 a practical sense, I agree with you, Chief
- 7 Justice Roberts, that Riley did point out that
- 8 cell phones were necessities. The dissents in
- 9 Smith and Miller pointed out that a private
- 10 telephone has become a necessity of business
- and personal life, and a bank account is a
- 12 necessity of carrying out financial
- 13 transactions.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Dreeben --
- MR. DREEBEN: The fact that --
- 16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- what you do in
- 17 bringing up Riley with the distinction you made
- 18 between -- you say it's the means that the
- 19 government is using -- -
- MR. DREEBEN: Uh-huh.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- we must be
- 22 concerned about, not the information it
- obtains. But in Riley, it was the most
- 24 traditional means. It was a search into an
- 25 arrest.

1 MR. DREEBEN: Yes, it was a search.

- 2 And I think that that's the key point. The
- 3 Court in footnote 1 of Riley actually reserved
- 4 whether acquiring aggregated information
- 5 through other means would be subject to a
- 6 different Fourth Amendment analysis.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Mr. Dreeben, it
- 8 seems like your whole argument boils down to if
- 9 we get it from a third-party we're okay,
- 10 regardless of property interest, regardless of
- 11 anything else. But how does that fit with the
- 12 original understanding of the Constitution and
- 13 writs of assistance?
- 14 You know, John Adams said one of the
- 15 reasons for the war was the use by the
- 16 government of third parties to obtain
- information forced them to help as their
- 18 snitches and snoops. Why -- why isn't this
- 19 argument exactly what the framers were
- 20 concerned about?
- 21 MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think that those
- 22 -- those were writs that allowed people acting
- 23 under governmental power to enter any place
- they wanted to search for anything that they
- 25 wanted.

| 1 | JUSTICE GORSUCH: Isn't that exactly |
|----|---|
| 2 | your argument here, that so long as a third |
| 3 | party's involved, we can get anything we want? |
| 4 | MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think the search |
| 5 | is being carried out under a writ of assistance |
| 6 | by a government agent, operating under |
| 7 | government authority; whereas here, we the |
| 8 | if there's a search in the acquisition of |
| 9 | cell site information, then it's the cell site |
| 10 | company that is acquiring that information |
| 11 | without governmental instigation, without |
| 12 | JUSTICE GORSUCH: The subpoena |
| 13 | MR. DREEBEN: governmental |
| 14 | agency |
| 15 | JUSTICE GORSUCH: being, though, |
| 16 | the equivalent of a writ of assistance? |
| 17 | MR. DREEBEN: Oh, I don't think a |
| 18 | subpoena is an equivalent of a writ of |
| 19 | assistance. A writ of assistance allowed the |
| 20 | agent to go into any house, to rip open |
| 21 | anything looking for contraband, no |
| 22 | limitations. |
| 23 | JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yeah. And you can |
| 24 | subpoena anything that any company has anywhere |
| 25 | in the globe regardless of any property rights, |

- 1 regardless of any privacy interests, simply
- because it's a third-party?
- 3 MR. DREEBEN: So I -- I think that, as
- 4 Justice Alito was explaining, there is a
- 5 traditional understanding that dates back to
- 6 the time of the founding that subpoenas stand
- on a different footing from search warrants.
- 8 And they do that because they are less
- 9 intrusive, since they do not require the
- 10 government going into private property and
- 11 searching itself.
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why does that
- 13 --
- MR. DREEBEN: And --
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- why does
- 16 that make a difference? The subpoena tells the
- 17 person who gets it: this is what you have to
- 18 do.
- MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think that most
- 20 --
- 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why is that
- 22 less intrusive? The whole question is whether
- 23 the information is accessible to the
- 24 government.
- 25 MR. DREEBEN: So I -- I think most

- 1 basically it makes a difference because this
- 2 Court's cases have said so from time
- 3 immemorial. And the reason why it has said so
- 4 is that if I go into your house to search, I
- 5 will expose a great deal of additional
- 6 information to government view beyond what is
- 7 sought by the terms of an authorization.
- And so, if I could just complete the
- 9 answer.
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Sure.
- 11 MR. DREEBEN: The -- the difference
- here is that the government is operating under
- 13 court supervision with an order that provides
- 14 particularity. It provides the interposition
- of a neutral magistrate between the government
- 16 and the acquisition of information. And it
- does require a showing that is less than
- 18 probable cause but is above what a traditional
- 19 subpoena requires.
- 20 So even if the Court does think that
- there is a search here, Congress has properly,
- in our view, calibrated the balancing of
- interests, and the Court should affirm it as a
- 24 constitutionally reasonable order.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,

| 1 | counsel. |
|----|---|
| 2 | Four minutes, Mr. Wessler. |
| 3 | REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF NATHAN F. WESSLER |
| 4 | ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER |
| 5 | MR. WESSLER: Thank you, Mr. Chief |
| 6 | Justice. |
| 7 | If I could begin, I have several |
| 8 | points, but to begin on that subpoena point. |
| 9 | And, Justice Alito, to your question about the |
| LO | historical pedigree of the subpoena doctrine, l |
| L1 | think this Court made absolutely clear in Riley |
| L2 | that the historical pedigree of older Fourth |
| L3 | Amendment doctrines does not automatically |
| L4 | determine the outcome in the digital age. |
| L5 | And as you yourself, Your Honor |
| L6 | recognized in your concurrence there, the |
| L7 | search incident to arrest doctrine had its |
| L8 | origins at least a century before the the |
| L9 | framing of the Fourth Amendment, and yet it |
| 20 | yielded to a new understanding. |
| 21 | And I think that |
| 22 | JUSTICE ALITO: That's certainly true, |
| 23 | but you'd want to so this is this would |

be revolutionary, to fundamentally change the

understanding of the application of the Fourth

24

- 1 Amendment to subpoenas. Do you want us to do
- 2 that?
- 3 MR. WESSLER: Well, I -- I don't think
- 4 it's revolutionary at all. And I think the
- 5 reason that is is the government's concession,
- as I hear it, that the contents of electronic
- 7 communications should be protected.
- 8 Once we recognized that there is an
- 9 exception for the contents of e-mails, we've
- 10 already acknowledged that the subpoena doctrine
- 11 can't stand in its most severe form. And if --
- if the contents of e-mails are to be protected,
- it's not because they are sealed in transit,
- 14 as, Justice Sotomayor, you pointed out.
- They're unlike in a fundamental way
- 16 the paper letters at issue in 1877 in Ex Parte
- 17 Jackson. They are actually accessible to and
- 18 accessed by the service providers, as the
- 19 government has argued in other cases, including
- 20 the Microsoft case to be heard later this --
- 21 this term.
- So, if they're to be protected, it's
- 23 because of their sensitivity and because of
- 24 people's long-standing expectation that their
- 25 communications are highly sensitive and would

- 1 remain private.
- 2 And as the concurrences at least
- 3 recognized in Jones, also highly private and
- 4 sensitive are these kinds of longer-term
- 5 location records.
- 6 Second, I just want to highlight that
- 7 the -- the government, Mr. Dreeben, as I heard
- 8 him, conceded that the precision of these
- 9 records doesn't matter at all to the
- 10 government's theory here.
- 11 They could be precise, I take it, to
- 12 within a single inch. And the fact that a
- third party has custody of them would, in the
- 14 government's view, vitiate any expectation of
- 15 privacy; which we think would be a very
- 16 destructive rule.
- 17 Third, this is not an area where the
- 18 Court should pause and wait for Congress to --
- 19 to act. My -- my colleague intimated that in
- 20 an area of -- of rapidly changing technology,
- 21 it's appropriate to -- to perhaps abstain and
- let Congress step in. We -- we are well over
- 23 two decades into the cell phone age. This is
- 24 an area where, as the Court recognized in
- 25 Riley, people's use of this technology is well

- 1 settled and only becoming more pervasive over
- 2 time. We know the -- the direction, the cases
- 3 before the Court now, and -- and it is crucial
- 4 that the Court act.
- 5 And, finally, to the property
- 6 principles, first one -- one statutory point,
- 7 Justice Alito, Section 222(c)(2) actually does
- 8 give the customer the right to obtain the
- 9 information. Now, as we pointed out in our
- 10 brief, the carriers have not reliably complied
- 11 with that, at least as of several years ago,
- 12 but --
- JUSTICE ALITO: No, I understand that,
- 14 but you said in your brief that the -- that the
- 15 companies wouldn't comply.
- 16 MR. WESSLER: That I -- I don't know
- 17 what the state of -- of play is today. As of a
- 18 few years ago, the last time I have
- information, they were not complying. But --
- 20 but under Fourth Amendment property principles,
- and property law more generally, it's of course
- 22 quite common for a property right to be divided
- 23 between different -- different parties; for the
- 24 bundle of sticks to be split up. And here
- 25 people have a right to exclude and a right to

- 1 determine use of the data secured by the
- 2 Telecommunications Act.
- 3 Certainly, we acknowledge that the --
- 4 the provider itself has some property right,
- 5 maybe several of those sticks in the bundle,
- 6 but that doesn't eliminate some right on -- on
- 7 the part of -- of -- of the customer.
- 8 If the Court has no further questions,
- 9 we ask that you reverse the Sixth Circuit.
- 10 JUSTICE ALITO: Could I just ask you
- 11 this question: Is any of this going to do any
- 12 good for -- for Mr. Carpenter?
- 13 (Laughter.)
- MR. WESSLER: Uh --
- 15 JUSTICE ALITO: Is he going to get
- 16 anything suppressed? Because under Illinois
- 17 versus Krull, if a search is conducted in
- 18 reliance on a statute authorizing the search in
- 19 accordance with a certain procedure, the
- 20 exclusionary rule doesn't apply.
- MR. WESSLER: May I answer? Thank
- 22 you.
- So the -- that question is not before
- 24 this -- this Court.
- JUSTICE ALITO: No, I understand that.

| 1 | MR. WESSLER: It will be dealt with on |
|----|--|
| 2 | remand. I think that we have arguments on |
| 3 | on both of the the types quite strong |
| 4 | arguments on both of the prongs of the good |
| 5 | faith exception. |
| 6 | On the statutory prong, the Stored |
| 7 | Communications Act provides two mechanisms, an |
| 8 | order and a warrant. And we think that that |
| 9 | makes this fundamentally different than other |
| 10 | statutes that may clearly provide a means. |
| 11 | And, second, on the court order, this |
| 12 | is unlike a warrant, and all of this Court's |
| 13 | cases on the good faith exception have dealt |
| 14 | with warrants based on affidavits from an |
| 15 | investigating officer, this is an unsworn |
| 16 | application from a prosecutor who we think |
| 17 | should know better. |
| 18 | Thank you. |
| 19 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, |
| 20 | counsel. The case is submitted. |
| 21 | (Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the case in |
| 22 | the above-entitled matter was submitted.) |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |
| 25 | |

Official - Subject to Final Review

| | Official Budgee | t to Tillal Keview | |
|---|--|--|--|
| 1 | abolishing [1] 75:1 | agency [1] 83:14 | applies [3] 39:17 59:3 75:19 |
| <u> </u> | above [4] 37:20 64:1,9 85:18 | agent [2] 83:6,20 | apply [6] 11:10 34:10 35:2 75:11 |
| 1 [2] 20 :6 82 :3 | above-entitled [2] 1:12 91:22 | agents [1] 26:10 | 76:4 90: 20 |
| 10 [3] 3 :7 29 :12 72 :7 | absent [1] 23:10 | 1 - | |
| 10:05 [2] 1: 14 3: 2 | | aggregate [2] 12:11 60:21 | approach [5] 38:15 52:1,2,4,16 |
| 100 [1] 28: 25 | absolute [1] 23:13 | aggregated [2] 6:25 82:4 | appropriate [2] 36:16 88:21 |
| 101 [1] 30:1 | absolutely [4] 5:10 14:22 24:8 86: | | approved [1] 52:16 |
| | 11 | ago [6] 12 :20 22 :11 27 :18 35 :12 | arbiter [1] 63:1 |
| 10th [1] 14:1 | abstain [1] 88:21 | 89: 11,18 | arbitrary [1] 32:18 |
| 11:27 [1] 91: 21 | abuse [1] 37:5 | agree [17] 5:10 6:11 15:11,21 17: | area [9] 8:7 10:7 19:21 44:8 49:16 |
| 120 [1] 10 :8 | accept [1] 32:13 | 20 24 :9 27 :4,8 28 :10,16 31 :20,25 | 69 :12 88 :17,20,24 |
| 127 [10] 3 :17 10 :4 13 :16 24 :7 25 : | acceptable [1] 8:23 | 34 :22 45 :15 53 :11 64 :18 81 :6 | areas [1] 29:21 |
| 24 27 :3 31 :22 36 :15 38 :7 68 :16 | accepting [1] 22:13 | agrees [1] 24:11 | arque [2] 45:21,22 |
| 152 [1] 36: 15 | access 5 11:20 19:8 22:23 44:12 | ahead [2] 57:22 72:12 | argued [1] 87:19 |
| 16-402 [1] 3:4 | | | , • |
| 18,000 [1] 20: 9 | 45 :16 | alerts [1] 15:6 | argument [17] 1:13 2:2,5,8 3:4,8, |
| 1877 [1] 87 :16 | accessed [1] 87:18 | ALITO [31] 4 :14,25 5 :11,17,25 6 :4, | 12 12 :25 19 :16 31 :19 39 :9 40 :1 |
| | accessible [4] 17:18 43:13 84:23 | 9 15 :10 16 :15 18 :16 22 :8 24 :24 | 71 :16 82 :8,19 83 :2 86 :3 |
| 1986 [2] 20: 5,7 | 87 :17 | 25 :9,14 55 :20 56 :8 60 :14 61 :3,4,9 | arguments [3] 21:4 91:2,4 |
| 1994 [4] 19 :7 20 :6,8,10 | accordance [1] 90:19 | 75 :14 76 :9 79 :2 84 :4 86 :9,22 89 :7, | around [1] 36:17 |
| 2 | according [1] 56:5 | 13 90 :10,15,25 | arrest [2] 81:25 86:17 |
| | accords [1] 12:5 | Alito's [1] 46:11 | Article [1] 60:3 |
| 20 [1] 35:7 | account 5 5:13 12:4 16:2 80:20 | allow [1] 79:2 | articulable [1] 50:10 |
| 2010 [2] 17 :21 28 :16 | 81:11 | allowed [2] 82:22 83:19 | articulated [1] 40:7 |
| 2011 [1] 28 :16 | | | |
| 2017 [1] 1: 10 | accrue [1] 17:25 | allows [4] 12:11 47:11,14 69:5 | aside [2] 38:15 52:3 |
| 221 [1] 38 :7 | accurate [1] 28:24 | alluded [1] 79:2 | asks [1] 40:23 |
| 222 [4] 39 :9 56 :17 59 :8 60 :6 | achieve [1] 54 :24 | almost [2] 23:11 26:22 | aspect [1] 35:25 |
| 222(c)(2 [1] 89:7 | Ackerman [1] 54:21 | already (য় 25:19 63:2 87:10 | aspects [1] 32:1 |
| 24 [10] 8 :1 9 :2,8 11 :15 12 :15,19 13 : | acknowledge [4] 21:7 52:18 57:2 | alter [2] 63:19 64:10 | asserting [1] 73:14 |
| | 90:3 | altered [1] 11:9 | assistance [5] 82:13 83:5,16,19, |
| 16 24 :7 25 :25 27 :16 | acknowledged [1] 87:10 | although । 6:20 12:6 18:2 | 19 |
| 24-hour [7] 7 :14,14 9 :10 11 :4 13 : | acquire [2] 51:12 71:24 | altogether [1] 47:16 | associations [2] 3:20 5:15 |
| 18,20 14: 16 | acquired [3] 50:18 72:1 78:13 | amended [2] 19:7 20:5 | assume [8] 19:13 60:23 65:3 72:4, |
| 24/7 [6] 47 :11,14 71 :1,18,25 72 :18 | - | Amendment [38] 7:11 18:7 22:16 | |
| 2703(c)(1)(A [1] 19:10 | acquires [1] 77:20 | | 5,11 74 :8,12 |
| 2703(d 6 19:8,19 21:15 37:13 69: | acquiring [8] 44:4,5,7 46:20 71:24 | | assumed [1] 78:11 |
| 13,15 | 78 :19 82 :4 83 :10 | 45 :20 57 :3,22 58 :5,8,14,22 59 :2,9 | assuming [1] 4:3 |
| 274 [1] 65:1 | acquisition ଔ 68:8 83:8 85:16 | 62 :17 63 :2,19 64 :2,3,10,11 73 :14 | assumption [1] 53:3 |
| 29 [1] 1 :10 | Act [11] 18:12 19:5,19 20:4,13 63: | 74 :18 75 :3,11,19 76 :4 77 :19,25 | attaching [2] 46:24 68:11 |
| | 24 64 :6 88 :19 89 :4 90 :2 91 :7 | 82 :6 86 :13,19 87 :1 89 :20 | attempted [2] 44:9 70:3 |
| 3 | acting [1] 82:22 | Americans [4] 17:17 20:6 27:21 | attributes [1] 61:12 |
| 3 [2] 2 :4 17 :14 | active [1] 49:15 | 48:17 | authorities [1] 11:20 |
| 30 [1] 13 :16 | activity [5] 14:3 50:13 68:7 70:13 | amicus [1] 17:14 | authority [1] 83:7 |
| | 76: 15 | among [1] 50:7 | authorization [2] 73: 23 85: 7 |
| 300,000 [1] 20 :10 | | , • | |
| 388 [1] 38:6 | actual [5] 16:25 29:14 30:20 61:8 | amount [6] 10:19 26:8 29:5,17 38: | |
| 4 | 76 :5 | 10 60 :8 | automatically [3] 15:4 16:12 86: |
| | actually [7] 10:3 17:24 36:18 59: | analog [1] 39:4 | 13 |
| 4 [1] 17 :14 | 12 82 :3 87 :17 89 :7 | analogize [1] 54:22 | available [7] 44:21 45:23,24 48:5, |
| 40 [2] 2 :7 13 :16 | Adams [1] 82:14 | analogous [1] 39:14 | 6 60 :24 74 :3 |
| 454 [1] 38 :5 | add [3] 34:14,18,25 | analysis [3] 16:3 27:10 82:6 | average [1] 30:2 |
| 5 | additional [4] 3:7 63:18 75:12 85: | analyze [1] 47:3 | avoid [4] 10:12 31:3 48:17,18 |
| | 5 | angle [2] 29:16 30:21 | away [3] 69:10 70:20 74:8 |
| 50 [1] 28: 25 | address [6] 7:15 11:13 25:20 35:6 | anonymous [1] 8:15 | |
| 6 | 44:21 49:14 | | B |
| | - | another [7] 12:13 38:6 46:5 64:20 | back 9 9:2 12:15 15:17 33:18 70: |
| 6 [1] 74 :22 | addressed [1] 35:15 | 70 :9 71 :7 75 :21 | 22 74 :9 75 :17,25 84 :5 |
| 8 | administrable [1] 9:9 | answer [6] 34:21 43:16 70:9 76:18 | · · |
| | adopt [1] 4:2 | 85 :9 90 :21 | bag [6] 23:19,20,21,24,25 24:2 |
| 86 [1] 2 :10 | advance [1] 12:2 | answers [1] 78:18 | balance [1] 38:12 |
| 9 | advanced [1] 14:25 | Anybody [1] 42:20 | balancing 11 85:22 |
| | advise [2] 3:6 17:1 | app [1] 34:1 | bank [19] 5:2,5,11,18 6:3,18 8:3 32 |
| 9 [1] 20 :7 | affected [1] 8:10 | appeals [1] 35:6 | 11 42 :6,7,8,10,11,17,18,21,22 80 : |
| 95 [1] 27: 21 | affects [1] 35:25 | 1 | 20 81 :11 |
| A | | appear [1] 68:14 | bank's [1] 42:8 |
| A | affidavit [2] 37:23 50:11 | APPEARANCES [1] 1:16 | banking 3 42:5 74:24 76:23 |
| a.m [3] 1:14 3:2 91:21 | affidavits [1] 91:14 | appeared [1] 10:17 | banks [1] 65:20 |
| ability [2] 12:14 29:14 | affirm [1] 85:23 | appendage [1] 43:9 | |
| able [3] 15:6 48:19,22 | afield [1] 57: 15 | application (3) 21:25 86:25 91:16 | based [7] 14:17 29:15 30:21 40:21 |
| abnormal (4) 65:45 | age [4] 24:12 35:4 86:14 88:23 | applied [2] 51:7 67:10 | 50 :10 74 :10 91 :14 |

age [4] 24:12 35:4 86:14 88:23

applied [2] 51:7 67:10

abnormal [1] 65:15

16 **81**:4.8 **83**:9.9 **88**:23

baselines [1] 63:20 basic [6] 36:20 42:1 51:14 67:6 75: 10 77:19 basically [7] 12:15 13:14 22:20 32: 22 51:8 79:23 85:1 basis [2] 11:4 65:13 become [2] 29:10 81:10 becoming [1] 89:1 bed [1] 43:4 bedrock [1] 44:19 bedroom [5] 14:8 43:1.11.13 44:2 beeper [2] 42:25 43:10 beepers [1] 42:25 begging [3] 35:9 62:15 63:9 begin [3] 34:10 86:7,8 beginning [1] 22:20 begins [1] 17:7 behalf [8] 1:18,20 2:4,7,10 3:13 40: 2 86:4 belief [1] 14:13 believe [7] 13:23 24:4 33:7 36:5 48:21 50:12 65:16 besides [1] 75:1 better [3] 72:6.7 91:17 between [20] 7:23 8:14 11:19.22 **13**:13,22 **27**:11 **29**:21 **37**:13 **44**:4 **45**:10 **47**:8 **62**:3 **68**:5,18 **70**:24 **75**: 16 **81**:18 **85**:15 **89**:23 beyond 5 14:13 22:15 64:1,9 85: big [3] 31:25 42:11 48:17 bill [1] 23:4 bit [1] 72:12 bitter [2] 59:20 21 blah [3] 35:23 23 23 blanket [1] 69:19 bodies [2] 67:20.21 body [3] 33:24 49:14 66:5 boils [1] 82:8 Bond [2] 23:15 50:24 books [1] 4:4 both [9] 4:23 15:25 24:13 47:4,9, 13 **76**:12 **91**:3,4 bothering [2] 11:22 65:4 bottom [1] 4:13 box [1] 34:22 Bovd [1] 75:25 BREYER [25] 31:1.18 33:16 34:14. 18 **64:**15.16 **65:**10.24 **66:**2.9.13.14 20 67:15 68:4 70:9 76:17 77:12. 16.23 78:1.5.8.15 brief [12] 7:24 17:14 19:17 21:14 24:11 31:4 38:4 44:8 65:13 73:18 89:10,14 briefly [1] 15:17 briefs [3] 28:1,2 30:6 bright [2] 7:22 9:10 bringing [1] 81:17 broad [5] 38:3 62:1 73:15,25 74:16 broadcast [1] 29:12 broadly [1] 17:24 broke [1] 38:19 Brother [1] 48:18 browsing [1] 24:20

bullet [1] 69:23 bundle [2] 89:24 90:5 burdensome [1] 74:1 business [19] 35:22 40:10,19,22 41:2 42:8 44:6,8 45:25,25 46:20 47:25 50:17 54:18 63:5,7 68:20, 21 81:10 business's [1] 41:3 businesses [2] 26:21 68:9

buys [1] 5:7 C cafe [1] 29:5 calibrated [2] 57:24 85:22 call [5] 8:16 16:11 41:18.20 72:2 called [5] 25:1.10 41:17 76:5 79: calling [3] 25:10 48:9 79:16 calls [9] 15:2 40:16 41:23,24 46:2 48:2 51:1,17 80:18 came [3] 1:12 8:16 72:23 cannot [6] 5:13 40:12 46:14 56:21 61:22 73:25 canvassing [1] 12:8 capability [4] 12:22 30:14,18,19 car [5] 29:1 46:16.25 71:3.5 card [6] 33:3.4 65:21 67:11.11 80: careful [1] 59:19 carefully [1] 50:6 CARPENTER [3] 1:3 3:4 90:12 Carpenter's [1] 22:1 carried [1] 83:5 carrier [3] 10:22 16:14 56:20 carriers [1] 89:10 carry [3] 27:21 42:8,15 carrying [2] 41:10 81:12 cars [1] 68:16 Case [35] 3:4.16 4:3 6:8 8:11 10:2 14:24 21:18.22 24:25 27:13 28:17 30:2 36:24 38:4 40:8 43:18 44:6 47:8.21 52:8 57:10 70:17 71:9.22. 24 72:21,25 74:10 75:16 76:19 78: 4 87:20 91:20,21 cases [27] 4:9 21:15,16 22:15 32:8, 9 33:17 36:22 38:2 47:4,10,13 64: 22 68:3,6 73:16 74:16 75:18,25 76:1,20 79:2,5 85:2 87:19 89:2 91: cash [1] 5:4 catalogue [1] 46:14 categorically [2] 27:19 37:1 categories [1] 33:20 category [1] 24:12 cause [13] 10:18 13:22 21:25 22:6 32:9 36:10,19 37:21 43:14 48:23 50:12 67:5 85:18 caution [1] 18:2 cell [50] 3:18 4:6 5:1 8:7 14:6,7,14 **15**:7 **20**:7,9,14,21 **22**:25 **25**:2 **26**: 21 29:19 30:14,15,24 40:8,12,14, 16,18 41:21 42:2 43:1,16,19 44:5,

7 **46:**22 **48:**3.10.11 **55:**4 **60:**17.20

64:24 69:10.12 72:2 73:5 80:12.

cells [1] 29:11 cellular [1] 47:23 century [1] 86:18 cert [1] 38:8 certain [4] 9:23 33:22 61:18 90:19 certainly [14] 4:17 11:25 16:12 20: 20 24:14 25:6.13 32:20 36:9 37: 21 39:16 41:14 86:22 90:3 cetera [3] 34:24 65:21 66:25 change [5] 31:25 32:1 56:14 72:15 86:24 changed [2] 64:23 66:6 changing [2] 49:12 88:20 character [1] 54:19 characterized [1] 56:12 chart [1] 5:13 check [6] 6:13 42:7,7,16,20,21 checking [1] 15:4 checkup [1] 29:4 CHIEF [24] 3:3.14 11:3.17 12:13 **31**:2 **34**:12.16 **35**:13 **39**:23 **40**:3 41:8 64:14 74:2 80:22.25 81:6 84: 12.15.21 85:10.25 86:5 91:19 choice [1] 81:3 choose [2] 40:18 45:6 chose [1] 71:22 Circuit [2] 38:8 90:9 circumstance [3] 23:10,11 27:14 circumstances [5] 32:19 57:25 62:18 67:23 70:24 circumvention [1] 9:20 claim [3] 38:23 52:12 63:23 clarity [1] 34:13 clear [7] 6:20 26:2 45:16 61:19 63: 17 **70**:2 **86**:11 clearly [2] 20:19 91:10 client [1] 38:22 clinic [1] 29:4 closer [2] 29:20 77:4 closest [1] 39:2 codefendant [1] 22:4 cognizance [1] 20:25 coherence [1] 12:25 coherent [1] 67:9 coherently [1] 66:19 collaborator [1] 21:20 collaborators [1] 21:19 collar [1] 32:6 colleague [3] 48:16 52:9 88:19 colleagues [1] 23:22 collecting [1] 60:8 collection [2] 3:17,21 combination [1] 28:13 combined [1] 28:7 come [2] 28:17 74:9 comes [2] 14:17 40:23 coming [1] 30:22 commence [1] 3:5 commerce [3] 4:22 6:16 16:8 commercial [4] 76:21 22 24 77:6 commercials [1] 16:20 committed [2] 13:23 69:2 common [2] 58:20 89:22

communicate [4] 40:15 46:5 47: 25 **51**:9 communication [4] 24:16 44:17. 17 45:17 Communications [10] 19:5,19 20: 4 24:10 45:15 63:24 64:6 87:7,25 communicative [1] 34:4 community [1] 12:16 companies [10] 30:15 40:8.17 45: 5 **47**:22 **60**:7 **61**:17.25 **65**:21 **89**: companies' [1] 18:9 company [25] 8:19 16:21 18:10 23: 3,7,9 **41**:9,11,16,19,19 **44**:11 **45**:3 **56**:2,3,4 **60**:17,20 **61**:2 **63**:6 **69**:11 73:6 80:16 83:10,24 company's [2] 17:22 60:22 comparison [1] 30:2 compelled [1] 78:9 complaint [1] 14:19 complete [2] 24:20 85:8 completely [2] 31:20 76:11 complex [1] 54:23 compliance [2] 18:24 74:11 complied [1] 89:10 complies [1] 37:2 comply [1] 89:15 complying [1] 89:19 compromise [2] 11:8 19:22 concede [3] 55:10,17 78:22 conceded [1] 88:8 concept [2] 48:18 49:3 concern [6] 10:23 13:3,8,12 35:15 concerned [2] 81:22 82:20 concerns [2] 13:5 15:13 concession [1] 87:5 conclude [1] 51:15 conclusion [1] 47:15 conclusively [1] 71:15 conclusory [1] 22:2 concurrence [1] 86:16 concurrences [5] 12:4 24:15 26: 2 27:9 88:2 concurring [3] 6:19 25:18 35:7 conduct [1] 42:18 conducted [1] 90:17 conducting [1] 76:14 confessed [1] 21:19 confronted [1] 63:23 Congress [26] 19:6 20:4,19 49:14, 15,19 **57**:18,24 **58**:2 **59**:25 **60**:2,5, 6 61:6.14 62:8,10,11,13,22 63:11, 13 64:5 85:21 88:18,22 Congress's [4] 19:24 49:24 58:3 64:8 congressional [1] 73:23 conjunction [1] 56:23 connection [1] 16:13 connections [2] 15:3 29:25 consent [4] 18:14 23:17 32:21 78: consequences [1] 52:19

consideration [1] 12:19 considered [2] 52:1 74:19 consistent [1] 34:8 constitute [1] 50:19 Constitution [11] 18:25 49:2 50:3, 4 **59**:14,15 **62**:23 **73**:10,12 **74**:11 constitutional [4] 18:8 49:22 57: 12 70:21 constitutionalize [1] 57:23 constitutionally [1] 85:24 constructive [2] 76:2.3 content [10] 22:22,24 24:12,16 45: 7,10 46:3 51:1,17 64:10 contents [9] 24:9 34:5,5 44:16 45: 15 17 87:6 9 12 context [7] 18:24 21:10 25:21 36: 21 59:23 64:5 74:20 contexts [1] 39:14 contiguous [1] 7:14 contraband [1] 83:21 contract [5] 16:23,24,25 17:21 80: contractual [2] 18:4.10 contractualize [1] 18:11 control [2] 44:25 59:14 controls [2] 58:22 59:15 conversation [4] 22:22,24 23:8 45.4 conversations [3] 14:15 44:12 79: conversion [6] 38:22,23 39:1,16 **52**·8 12 conveyed [3] 4:20 16:5 54:18 conveying [1] 80:4 cooperating [2] 22:3,4 corollary [1] 63:15 correct [1] 14:22 corroborative [1] 10:6 couldn't [1] 60:2 counsel [7] 3:6 31:2 39:24 53:5, 23 86:1 91:20 count [1] 46:10 couple [1] 46:9 course [2] 63:7 89:21 COURT [65] 1:1.13 3:15 4:9.19 7: 15.21 **9**:9.12 **10**:3 **11**:13.14 **12**:1.3 13:9 17:3 18:3.5 20:24 22:1.11 23: 24 25:20 34:10 35:9.11 36:24 40: 4,6 **43**:18 **45**:11 **46**:25 **47**:2 **51**:7, 15 **57**:21 **59**:3,18,22 **62**:19 **63**:1, 15,17 **64:**2 **72:**16,25 **73:**16 **74:**10, 22 **75**:18 **76**:5 **78**:11 **79**:14 **82**:3 85:13,20,23 86:11 88:18,24 89:3, 4 **90**:8,24 **91**:11 Court's 5 9:20 31:9 74:15 85:2 91.12 courtroom [4] 15:9 29:13 72:9.10 courts [8] 32:25 33:17 34:9 35:2.6 **37:**18 **39:**10.12 craft [1] 9:12 crazy [1] 18:6 create [6] 29:25 41:11 50:1 55:24, 25 **62**:4

created [6] 4:20 41:9 50:25 61:8 63:25 67:14 creates [5] 54:4 59:4,6,12,17 creating [1] 50:24 credit [4] 33:2,3 65:21 67:10 crime [11] 8:3,21 13:19,23,25 32:6 **47**:5 **65**:17 **69**:2.4 **76**:24 crimes [2] 9:22 26:7 criminal [4] 14:3 32:9 50:13 70:13 crucial [1] 89:3 CSI [1] 17:10 CSLI [1] 7:7 culpable [1] 69:3 current [2] 35:18 73:7 currently [1] 38:9 custody [1] 88:13 customer [17] 17:1 41:3,6 46:1 56: 6,18 59:6 60:15,18,18 61:10,11 62:7 63:8.11 89:8 90:7 customer's [1] 62:6 customers [2] 40:11 62:5 cuts [1] 12:19

D

D.C [2] 1:9.20 data [23] 4:13 10:4.16.19 11:1 14: 23 **15**:1.2 **16**:13 **24**:22 **26**:22 **28**: 18.23 29:2.10.18.25 30:1.23 33:24 25 **38:**5 **90:**1 dates [1] 84:5 day [14] 7:8,8,8 8:20 9:16 10:7 11: 10 13:25 14:1,1,1 27:17 30:1 49:6 days [19] 3:17 9:24 10:4,8 24:7 25: 24 **27**:3,17 **31**:22 **32**:17,18 **36**:15 38:5,7,7 65:1 66:23 68:16 81:3 deal [2] 19:14 85:5 dealing [2] 45:13,14 dealt [2] 91:1.13 death [1] 23:10 debatable [1] 16:16 debit [2] 67:11 80:20 decades [3] 22:11 35:12 88:23 decide [3] 57:10 73:1 74:10 decided [5] 22:11 27:16 47:22 63: deciding [1] 80:15 decision [3] 74:4,23 81:1 decisions [2] 31:10 40:21 declare [2] 15:15 56:17 defendant [2] 10:20 38:6 defer [2] 49:24 50:1 define [2] 7:22 33:19 defined [1] 50:6 definitely [1] 63:1 degree [1] 76:13 delineate [1] 9:23 demand [1] 74:7 dense [1] 29:20 deny [3] 55:1,4,8 Department [1] 1:20 **Deputy** [1] 1:19 describe [1] 75:18 described [1] 69:21

destroy [1] 56:3

destroying [1] 56:4 destructive [1] 88:16 details [3] 14:4,10 21:20 determination [3] 19:24 36:19 58: determine [4] 59:9 60:3 86:14 90: determined [1] 46:21 Detroit [1] 44:9 developed [2] 39:11 79:5 developina [1] 43:23 device [2] 46:25 68:11 devices [1] 27:21 devotes [1] 26:8 diagnostic [4] 67:18 77:5 78:1,2 dial [1] 48:2 dialed [3] 72:21,23 79:21 differ [1] 42:2 difference [17] 8:14 10:9 13:22 27: 11 28:14,20 35:19 37:13 42:12 45: 10 **47**:7 **62**:3 **68**:5 **75**:16 **84**:16 **85**: 1 11 different [24] 13:3 42:14 44:11.15. 18 **46**:8.9.17.19 **47**:13.17 **54**:24 **71**:6,16,21,23 **76**:6,9,12 **82**:6 **84**:7 89:23.23 91:9 differentiate [1] 8:25 differentiating [1] 13:13 differently [1] 31:6 difficult [3] 10:1 19:22 68:13 digital [7] 4:13 24:12,19 35:3,10 67:13 86:14 direct [3] 30:12 47:4 68:7 directed [1] 6:17 direction [2] 18:4 89:2 directly [3] 13:9 39:19 42:17 disagree [4] 15:21 25:7 72:16 77: 23 disclosable [1] 23:2 disclose [12] 5:5,6,7,8 17:2,22 18: 22 22:21 23:21 51:1 56:21 62:6 disclosed [3] 23:17 56:24 62:12 disclosure [4] 19:6 22:21 45:1 59: disclosures [1] 17:24 discrete [1] 33:19 discussing [1] 6:9 discussion [1] 54:23 dissent [1] 22:22 dissenting [2] 35:8 79:10 dissents [1] 81:8 distance [1] 29:21 distinction [4] 16:7 44:4 68:18 81: distinguish [2] 4:15 76:19 distinguished [2] 15:18,24 disturbs [1] 3:22 divided [1] 89:22 doctor's [1] 14:9 doctors [1] 23:18 doctrine [10] 11:8 23:14 41:4 63:5. 16 **72**:15 **75**:2 **86**:10.17 **87**:10 doctrines [1] 86:13

documents [4] 17:25 18:4,10 75:

Doe [2] 8:16,20 doing [7] 5:16 13:15 40:24,25 78: 23 79:25 80:10 Donovan [1] 73:17 down [4] 24:7 51:20 70:3 82:8 dragnet [4] 13:6,14 14:3,20 dramatically [2] **64:**23 **66:**6 draw [12] 7:21 9:9,13 19:22 65:6,7 **66**:10.12 **67**:24.25 **72**:16 **79**:17 drawers [1] 35:22 drawing [1] 11:18 drawn [2] 4:10 66:19 draws [1] 10:3 DREEBEN [120] 1:19 2:6 39:25 40: 1,3 **41**:14 **42**:13,23 **43**:15,22,24 44:3,14 45:8 46:7,18 47:20 48:14, 25 **49**:7,11 **50**:16,21 **51**:5,19 **52**: 17,22,24 **53:**2,13,15,19 **54:**2,9,15 **55**:3,10,13,16,20 **56**:8,19,22 **57**:5, 14,18 58:5,6,9,15,19,24 59:2,7,11, 16,22 **60**:4,14 **61**:3,5,13,24 **62**:8, 11,19,25 **63**:13 **64**:12 **65**:8,23 **66**: 1.8.12.18 67:8 68:4 69:14.18.20 **70**:1,7,20 **71**:20 **72**:14 **73**:7,11,21 **74**:6 **75**:15 **76**:8,11 **77**:11,14,18 **78**:3,6,9,16 **79**:5,8,21 **80**:13,23 **81**: 5,14,15,20 **82:**1,7,21 **83:**4,13,17 84:3,14,19,25 85:11 88:7 dressing [1] 14:11 drew [2] 11:14 22:25 drill [1] 51:20 drugs [1] 32:6 due [1] 59:23 dump [4] 8:3.6.14 13:4 duration [1] 8:21 durational [1] 9:21 during [1] 13:20 Ε e-mail [3] 45:7 54:20 55:5 e-mails [5] 15:5 34:5 45:6 87:9.12 E911 [3] 30:8,16 78:20

each [5] 7:8,9 9:18 23:5 36:17 earlier [2] 23:13 69:21 early [2] 68:24 70:11 easily [1] 45:4 easy [1] 9:23 economic [2] 38:21 52:13 effect [6] 17:21 52:15 53:12.16 54: 14 55:9 effective [1] 28:7 efforts [1] 64:8 eiaht [2] 9:5.6 eighth [1] 72:9 either [2] 18:4 55:11 elapsed [1] 14:23 electronic [3] 24:9 31:23 87:6 element [3] 80:15,17,19 eliminate [1] 90:6 emerge [1] 34:13 emphasized [1] 81:2 emphasizing [1] 7:3 empirical [2] 16:16 17:13

foremost [1] 50:7

employ [1] 71:22 enacted [1] 20:4 end [3] 18:7 22:3 23:5 endeavor [1] 26:3 enforcement [7] 20:21 25:23 26:8 43:13 46:13 60:12 78:16 engage [1] 42:5 engaged [1] 6:12 enhanced [2] 63:18 64:8 enough [4] 17:8 21:17,21 69:1 enter [1] 82:23 entered [1] 24:19 entertainment [1] 5:22 entire [4] 13:20 35:20 71:11,19 entirely [1] 22:7 envelope [2] 44:24,24 equally [1] 9:17 equivalent [2] 83:16,18 essence [1] 14:18 essential [1] 70:23 essentially [2] 40:9 71:10 establishments [2] 5:22.22 estimate [2] 29:14 30:20 et [3] 34:23 65:21 66:25 even [22] 12:15 13:16.25 14:11 17: 5,18 **19:**3,20 **23:**6,17 **26:**3 **27:**15 **28**:23 **29**:19 **50**:24 **56**:6 **68**:16 **69**: 16,16 **74**:12 **75**:11 **85**:20 eventually [1] 33:1 everybody [10] 12:16,16 17:7,9 23: 2 26:22,23,23 71:12,13 everybody's [1] 14:4 everything [3] 5:6 24:21 80:23 everywhere [3] 16:21 43:8 72:1 evidence [2] 10:22 29:6 Ex [1] 87:16 exactly [7] 7:22 28:6 47:12 68:23 **69**:22 **82**:19 **83**:1 example [7] 5:19 12:9 22:20 34:2 **38**:23 **52**:12 **55**:22 Except [2] 18:16 50:5 exception [10] 11:5 32:24 50:25 **64**:21 **67**:6,17,19 **87**:9 **91**:5,13 exceptions [2] 50:23 64:20 exclude [1] 89:25 exclusionary [1] 90:20 **exculpatory** [2] **10**:13,22 Excuse [1] 9:1 exist [1] 64:21 existed [1] 55:18 existence [1] 20:20 existing [1] 15:14 expect [4] 10:15 23:23 24:6 48:22 expectation [18] 3:23 6:21 12:6 16:2 19:1 23:9 24:1 26:13,21 27:2 38:16 46:12 52:2,4 64:1 71:14 87: expectations [6] 26:19 44:15 47: 3.18 49:12 64:4 expected [1] 6:23 explain [3] 18:1 67:9 75:19 explaining [1] 84:4 explored [1] 38:24 expose [2] 23:25 85:5

expressly [1] 74:23 extend [1] 22:15 extended [1] 11:7 extending [1] 22:19 extension [1] 4:11 extensive [1] 48:6 extracting [1] 78:24 extraordinarily [1] 38:3 extraordinary [1] 38:10 extremely [1] 79:18

face [3] 21:25 58:1.4

faced [1] 65:16 fact [11] 21:4 28:11 33:11 49:19 53: 9 64:7 67:22 69:15 80:10 81:15 factors [5] 16:1 36:25 67:25 68:2 80.7 facts [2] 50:10 51:22 factual [1] 70:24 failure [1] 49:17 faith [2] 91:5,13 fall [1] 25:5 fallible [1] 31:21 far [4] 24:3 48:8 57:15 72:19 favor [1] 17:25 FBI [1] 32:5 FCC [2] 60:24.25 federal [2] 39:6 69:24 feel [1] 23:19 feet [1] 28:25 Ferguson [3] 23:15 50:24 78:3 fertility [2] 24:22 33:25 few [4] 28:21 32:23 64:20 89:18 fewer [1] 20:14 field [2] 69:6 70:4 fields [1] 72:8 fighting [1] 53:23 figure [1] 70:12 figuring [1] 70:4 fillina [1] 3:9 finally [1] 89:5 financial [6] 6:12 32:12 33:2 42: 15,18 **81:**12 financing [2] 32:7 65:18 find [3] 12:23 35:21 69:6 fired [1] 69:23 first [7] 14:21 17:13 28:16,22 37:2 **75:2 89:**6 fit [1] 82:11 five [7] 6:19 27:17 33:6 35:6 46:10. 25 47:1 Florida [1] 70:1 focus [2] 36:3,12 Focusing [1] 38:14 follow [4] 6:7 31:21,24 52:20 followed [2] 25:23,25

following [2] 6:11 27:3

Footnote [2] 74:22 82:3

force [2] 55:25 56:3

football [1] 72:8

footing [1] 84:7

forced [1] 82:17

forever [1] 31:24 form [1] 87:11 forth [1] 10:9 founding [1] 84:6 four 5 10:25 18:23 22:11 35:11 Fourth [40] 7:11 14:1 18:6 22:16 26:15 28:20 31:9 11 38:8 40:7 41: 5 **45**:19 **57**:3.22 **58**:5.8.13.20.21 59:2.9 62:17 63:2.19 64:2.3.9.11 **73**:14 **74**:17 **75**:10.19 **76**:4 **77**:19. 25 82:6 86:12.19.25 89:20 framers [1] 82:19 framework [5] 19:4 51:6,14 76:10, framing [1] 86:19 frankly [1] 26:17 free [1] 6:23 frequent [1] 65:14 friend [1] 29:5 full [1] 6:15 fully [2] 10:15 21:7 function [2] 40:9,12 functioning [1] 45:18 functions [1] 45:24 fundamental [2] 49:3 87:15 fundamentally [5] 46:19 71:21 76: 7 **86**:24 **91**:9 funds [2] 4:22 6:17 further [1] 90:8 future [4] 17:6 33:17 73:3 77:9 G

gather [3] 10:18 56:1 70:12 gathered [3] 12:7 14:24 15:1 gathering [1] 56:2 General [2] 1:19 28:5 generalized [2] 43:19 48:10 generally [2] 28:18 89:21 generated [2] 35:7 48:1 qets [2] 41:21 84:17 getting 9 9:25 35:19 68:19 69:22 71:1 72:6 78:25 79:11 80:17 GINSBURG [11] 7:2,6 8:1 9:1,15 18:18 21:13 37:12 81:14,16,21 give [9] 19:23 21:3 42:7,10,10 60: 10 **71**:19 **80**:6 **89**:8 given [9] 5:16 32:19 34:21 49:23 61:25 71:7.10 77:24 78:11 gives [1] 42:11 giving [3] 32:20 42:16 71:17 gleaned [1] 28:4 globe [1] 83:25 Google [2] 24:20 34:6 GORSUCH [45] 30:4 38:13 39:3,8, 15,18,21 **51:**19 **52:**21,23,25 **53:**4,8 14,17,22 **54**:2,6,10,25 **55**:6,12,15, 19 **56**:16,20,25 **57**:7,17 **58**:3,7,11, 17,21,25 **59**:5,8,13,20 **60**:1 **82**:7 83:1,12,15,23 Gorsuch's [1] 62:16 qot [8] 39:9 50:10 53:6.9 60:21 70: 8 **72**:21 **76**:18

gotten [1] 67:3 government [58] 10:15 12:10,21 15:6 17:3 18:20 19:4 21:23 24:11 **27**:25 **30**:16 **36**:23 **37**:4 **38**:4 **40**: 20,23 44:21 46:23 48:5,19,22 49: 5 **50:**5,19 **51:**2 **57:**1 **61:**21 **65:**3,15 **66:**23 **68:**10,18,20,24 **70:**2,25 **73:** 5 **75**:6 **76**:13 **77**:20 **78**:10,12,13, 17.20 **79:**24 **80:**10 **81:**19 **82:**16 **83:** 6,7 **84**:10,24 **85**:6,12,15 **87**:19 **88**: government's [9] 3:17 12:14 22: 14 **57**:4 **58**:11,12 **87**:5 **88**:10,14 governmental [6] 30:8 68:7,8 82: 23 83:11.13 GPS [5] 28:18 29:2 44:4 46:24 78: Graham [1] 38:8 grand [3] 31:5,10,13 granularity [1] 73:2 great [3] 16:6 24:18 85:5 Greenwood [1] 63:21 around [3] 15:24 32:10 58:20 arounds [1] 15:18 grow [1] 44:18 guess [1] 16:24

guidance [1] 35:9

Н Hale [1] 75:25 half [3] 15:9 29:13 72:8 hamper [1] 60:12 handset [1] 78:20 happen [5] 17:6 26:14 27:14 73:2, happened [3] 12:17 13:25 26:6 happens [1] 8:3 happenstance [1] 18:9 happy [1] 11:25 hardly [1] 73:13 hear [4] 3:3 16:20 34:19 87:6 heard [3] 51:11 87:20 88:7 hearing [1] 19:18 heart [1] 33:24 heavily [1] 18:3 heightened [1] 77:24 held [4] 4:19 21:11 31:11,14 help [2] 11:2 82:17 helps [1] 41:11 Henkel [1] 76:1 herself [1] 10:21 highlight [1] 88:6 highly [9] 24:18 26:3 31:16 35:3 **67**:24 **73**:12 **77**:3 **87**:25 **88**:3 hinging [1] 18:8 historical [8] 15:7 20:21,23 30:24 **35**:5 **38**:5 **86**:10,12 historically [1] 30:22 history [1] 24:21 hold [2] 17:4,5 home [3] 34:2,3 57:11 homeowner [1] 34:3 Honor [16] 6:11 7:12 9:7 10:14 11:

24 14:21 17:13 20:18 21:6 24:8

25:4.19 27:9 35:1 36:9 86:15 Honor's [2] 54:21 68:22 Honors [1] 33:18 hoped [1] 58:18 hospital [4] 23:18 67:18 78:2,13 hotels [1] 5:21 hour [1] 8:20 hours [12] 8:1 9:2.8 11:15.15.23 **12**:15.20 **13**:16 **24**:7 **25**:25 **27**:17 house [6] 35:20 43:17 51:16 69:8 83:20 85:4 however [1] 11:5 human [1] 67:1 hypothetical [9] 26:6 27:7 53:5, 23 **54**:1,3,7,11 **55**:7 hypotheticals [1] 53:24

i.e [1] 33:2 idea [1] 70:2 identified [4] 16:1 36:23,24 59:3 identifies [1] 21:19 identify [1] 38:3 identity [1] 70:24 III [2] 57:10 60:3 Illinois [1] 90:16 illustrate [1] 44:9 illustrates [1] 64:7 illustration [1] 57:21 imagine [1] 77:7 imagined [2] 22:12 35:11 immediately [3] 32:15,25 33:5 immemorial [1] 85:3 imperfections [1] 34:20 **implicate** [1] **41:**5 important [4] 22:9 32:8 43:17 63: inch [1] 88:12 incident [1] 86:17 incident-related [2] 13:13 14:18 incidental [1] 45:16 include [4] 49:4 74:21 75:2.3 including [3] 15:3 42:15 87:19 inconsistent [1] 81:1 incredibly [1] 79:11 inculpated [1] 70:14 inculpatory [1] 10:17 indeed [1] 46:13 indicate [2] 20:25 61:14 indicates [1] 53:9 individual [11] 8:15 12:22.23 13: 24 23:20 41:10 50:13 68:19 69:3

20 44:5,6,7,20 45:11,14,22 46:3, 22 48:11 49:5,20 50:11 51:9 52: 11 **54**:5,12,17 **55**:5,23 **56**:7,15,18 **57:**20 **59:**1,6 **60:**8,16,19,19,21,24 61:1,22 62:4,5,6 63:5,11,12 64:19, 24,25 65:20 66:24 67:21,24 68:8, 19 **69**:1,5,11,22 **70**:11,12 **71**:1,7, 11,17,23 **72:**2,17,19 **73:**6 **74:**7,22, 25 75:8 76:21,23,25 77:3,6,20,22, 24 78:19,21,24,25 79:7,12,15 80:1 4 81:22 82:4.17 83:9.10 84:23 85: 6.16 89:9.19 informed [1] 78:11 innocence [1] 10:7 innocent [1] 13:7 insight [1] 30:9 insisting [1] 52:18 instance [1] 49:16 instances [1] 49:7 instigation [1] 83:11 instrument [2] 6:14 16:8 instruments [1] 4:21 insufficient [1] 21:10 intended [1] 61:6 intentional [1] 9:14 interact [1] 61:16 interest [13] 19:15 20:21 51:10 54: 4 **55**:1,4,8 **56**:10,12 **57**:25 **59**:4 **74**: 13 82:10 interested [2] 33:8.15 interests [13] 50:8 57:12,19,23 58: 9 **59**:17,24 **60**:10,11,13 **61**:16 **84**: 1.85:23

interfered [1] 65:25 interior [1] 34:1 intermediary [2] 45:19 46:4 interpersonal [1] 6:14 interposition [1] 85:14 interpretive [1] 34:9 intervening [1] 29:9 intimate [4] 14:4,10 33:3 79:11 intimated [1] 88:19 intrude [4] 47:17 50:5,7 51:3 intrusion [1] 76:13 intrusive [2] 84:9.22

invade [1] 13:17 invasion [2] 10:24 26:11 investigating [1] 91:15 investigation [5] 21:12 36:14 37:

10 **68**:25 **70**:12 investigations [3] 20:2 36:13 68:

invitation [1] 22:14 involve [4] 11:7 13:5 42:16,17 involved [7] 4:16 21:9 46:23,24 50:13 78:9 83:3

involves [5] 13:9 43:19 44:7 46:20 72.17

involving [3] 31:10 49:11 68:6 irrelevant [1] 19:20

isn't [9] 12:18 13:11 21:21 49:3 62: 9 75:17 76:6 82:18 83:1

issuance [1] 37:17 issue [10] 3:16 22:21 31:14 35:16 60:3 63:25 68:13 74:4 75:15 87:

itself [8] 19:4 28:12 29:2 45:12 68: 13 76:14 84:11 90:4

J

IVORY [1] 1:3

Jackson [1] 87:17 iewelry [1] 29:3

John [4] 8:16,16,20 82:14 joint [1] 41:10

Jones [25] 3:21 4:11 6:20 9:21 12: 5 24:15 25:18 26:2 27:10 28:19. 23 46:8.8.23 47:8.16 51:23.24 52: 16 **70:**25 **71:**3.8.22 **75:**17 **88:**3 iudae [7] 21:9 25:15.19 37:24 57:

10 60:3 69:24

judgment [2] 26:19 50:2 Judicial [3] 11:14 19:25 76:16 jury [3] 31:5,10,13

Justice [216] 1:20 3:3,15 4:1,14,25 **5**:11,17,24,25 **6**:2,4,8 **7**:2,4,6,17, 25,25 8:9,13,24 9:1,15 10:5,11 11: 2,3,17 **12**:13 **13**:4,11 **15**:10 **16**:15

18:16.18 **19**:16 **20**:3.12.16 **21**:2. 13 **22:**8.18 **24:**24 **25:**9.14.22 **26:**5. 17 27:1.6.23 28:15 30:4 31:1.2.18 33:16 34:12.14.16.18 35:13 37:12 38:13 39:3.8.15.18.21.23 40:3 41:

7,8 42:9,13,23 43:6,15,21,24 44:1, 10,23 46:7,11,19 47:6 48:14 49:1, 8,9,18 **50**:20,22 **51**:19,21 **52**:21,23

25 **53**:4,8,14,17,22 **54**:2,6,10,25 **55**:6,12,15,19,20 **56**:8,16,20,25 **57**: 7,17 58:3,7,11,17,21,25 59:5,8,13, 20 60:1,14 61:3,4,9,20 62:2,9,14,

16,21 **63**:9 **64**:12,14,14,15,16 **65**: 10,24 66:2,9,13,14,15,20 67:15 68:

4 **69**:7.16.19.21.25 **70**:5.9.19 **72**:4 **73**:4,9,20 **74**:2 **75**:14 **76**:9,17 **77**: 12.16.23 **78:**1.5.8.15.18 **79:**2.4.9.

10.20.22 **80:**14.22.25 **81:**7.14.16. 21 82:7 83:1,12,15,23 84:4,12,15, 21 85:10,25 86:6,9,22 87:14 89:7,

13 90:10,15,25 91:19 justices [3] 6:19 46:10 47:15

K

KAGAN [17] 11:2 27:23 28:15 46:7 19 47:6 64:12 70:19 72:4 73:4,9, 20 79:4,9,20,22 80:14

Kagan's [1] 51:21 Katz [3] 45:16 51:15 52:4

keep [4] 4:3 7:2 46:21 61:23

keeping [1] 23:3 keeps [1] 72:6

KENNEDY [21] **4**:1 **5**:24 **6**:2 **7**:4 10:5,11 19:16 20:3,12,16 21:2 25: 22 26:5,17 27:1,6 69:7,16,19,25

70:5 kept [2] 30:8,13

key [1] 82:2 killed [1] 69:9

kind [7] 12:10 30:5 60:23 61:22 73:

1 79:7.8

kinds [8] 4:12 20:25 32:11 65:19 67:13 68:6 79:17 88:4

knowledge [2] 6:15 39:13

known [2] 6:5,5

knows [3] 23:2 26:23 34:3

Krull [1] 90:17 Kyllo [1] 4:11

L

label [2] 61:7,14 lack [1] 80:3 lacked [1] 28:24 lacks [2] 37:22 38:1 laid [1] 27:10 landline [2] 48:4 80:18

landscape [1] 22:13

large [4] 13:6 29:19 32:8 60:8

last [1] 89:18 lastly [1] 18:15 lasts [1] 26:10 later [2] 12:23 87:20 laudatory [1] 49:21

Laughter [6] 26:25 43:5 53:7 55:

14 66:17 90:13 laundering [1] 32:6

law [25] 18:17,23 19:5 20:21 25:22 26:7 32:14 38:17.23 39:7.7 43:13 **46**:12 **53**:9.17.20 **56**:14.24 **60**:12 62:13,17 63:24 64:18 78:16 89:21

laws [1] 63:17 lawyer [1] 53:25 leap [1] 57:22

least [6] 16:1 32:17 65:15 86:18

88:2 89:11 leave [1] 44:1 leaving [1] 77:8 led [2] 38:2 51:14

legal [3] 33:7 40:6 58:1 legislation [1] 31:7

legislative [1] 20:23 legitimate [2] 13:17 60:12

less [16] 4:24 6:8 17:18 25:8,11,11 28:18 29:7,22 33:12 37:5 41:15

70:10 84:8,22 85:17

lesser [1] 76:12 lesson [2] 4:10 24:14 letter [1] 44:19 letters [1] 87:16

level [1] 62:22

life [6] 14:10.20 32:2 36:1 80:24 81:

lifetime [2] 73:6 75:7 likened [1] 37:18

limitations [1] 83:22 limited [6] 4:17,18 9:24 12:7 23:14 **75:**10

limiting [1] 14:2

line [23] 7:22,23 9:9,10,14 10:4 11: 15,18,19,22 19:23 22:25 32:13 33: 11 **65**:5,7 **66**:10 **72**:17 **73**:16,20 77:4 79:1,5

lines [2] 30:5 55:21 list [1] 32:8

72:1 78:24

infallible [1] 31:24

inference [1] 29:6

inferences [1] 79:16

individual's [2] 46:15 80:3

information [147] 3:18,22 4:7,18 5:

2,11 **6:**3 **7:**7 **9:**4,24 **10:**13 **11:**7,11,

19,21 **15**:8,20 **16**:14 **17**:2,11,18,23

18:13 **20**:22 **24**:22 **25**:16,20 **28**:3,

8,12,14 **29**:23,25 **30**:7 **31**:23 **32**:

12 33:2.20.23 34:1 36:8 38:18.20

40:13,15,17,19 41:2,18,20,22 43:

listen [2] 14:15 23:8 listened [1] 45:3 literal [3] 75:23.24 76:5 little [1] 72:12 locate [2] 15:8 48:19 located [2] 40:14 48:11 location [28] 3:18 4:7 5:2 15:7 16: 14 17:23 20:22 24:4.17 25:12 29: 15.22.25 **30**:13.20.25 **32**:2.14 **33**: 12 23 35:5 36:8 38:5 43:17 49:6 **52:**11 **72:**22 **88:**5 locations [6] 3:19 5:7.14 6:24 12: 8 22:17 Lone [1] 73:17 long [11] 3:20 5:15 7:23 10:25 11: 5 **12**:11 **14**:1 **26**:11 **46**:16 **67**:2 **83**: long-standing [3] 3:23 74:15 87: longer [2] 7:3 10:6 longer-term [4] 3:24 4:6 6:24 88: look [7] 20:24 36:8 43:22 60:7 66: 22 67:17 74:23 looked [1] 59:18 looking [7] 13:15 19:3,11 51:22 **59**:24 **72**:12 **83**:21 looks [1] 23:25 lose [1] 66:16 lost [1] 71:14 lot [10] 5:3 29:2 35:13.14 36:12 51: 22 56:9 60:22 63:14 74:24 lots [1] 16:21 lower [6] 32:25 33:17 34:9 35:1 37: 17.17 M

machine [1] 12:10 made [13] 6:19 22:6 26:2 27:20 43: 13 **48**:5.6 **50**:23 **61**:19 **63**:17 **67**: 17 81:17 86:11 magistrate [2] 37:24 85:15 magistrate's [1] 74:4 mail [1] 44:20 mailed [1] 44:19 main [1] 46:14 maintain [1] 51:16 majority [2] 17:16 35:7 mandate [3] 30:16,24 40:20 many [9] 9:5 24:18 28:8 32:1 35:8 42:17 48:8 66:23.23 markedly [2] 14:25 29:10 Marvland [1] 4:4 Massachusetts [1] 11:14 matter [9] 1:12 10:2 12:2 16:9 80: 1,2,8 88:9 91:22 matters [1] 77:21 mean [11] 16:15,19 20:12,13 32:15 36:1,7 49:24 60:16 71:2 74:5 means [8] 29:18 47:13 51:12 71: 21 81:18,24 82:5 91:10 measure [2] 49:21 64:3 measured [1] 49:13

mechanisms [2] 19:8 91:7

media [1] 15:5 medical [5] 23:16,18 24:22 29:4 77:24 meet [1] 29:5 members [3] 20:24 46:25 47:2 memory [1] 31:21 mentioned [3] 22:2 48:15 61:12 message [1] 16:11 messages [2] 15:2,5 messaging [1] 64:4 met [1] 68:2 meters [1] 29:12 methamphetamine [1] 36:7 MetroPCS [2] 16:23 17:20 MICHAEL [3] 1:19 2:6 40:1 Microsoft [1] 87:20 might [8] 9:25 10:12 13:5 24:5 27: 14 **55:**1 **70:**13 **80:**7 mightily [1] 35:2 Miller [21] 4:3,3,15,16 15:17,24,25 **22**:10 **32**:24 **34**:20 **35**:3 **41**:1.16 **42**:4 **50**:25 **51**:7.8 **52**:5 **66**:25 **74**: 23 81:9 mine [1] 21:16 minute [1] 34:20 minute-by-minute [1] 5:13 minutes [2] 3:7 86:2 Mobile [1] 38:20 moment [6] 5:16 18:2 24:5 38:16 **52**:4 **64**:18 moments [1] 24:5 money [1] 32:6 monitor [1] 46:14 monitorina [1] 68:10 month [2] 23:5 72:9 months [5] 10:25 12:20 27:17 49: 9.10 Moore [1] 63:22 mornina [1] 3:4 most [11] 9:8 14:9 21:14 33:3 43:3 48:16 63:22 81:23 84:19,25 87:11 movement [2] 46:15 65:1 movements [6] 3:19,24 5:14 12: 12 68:11 71:25 much [10] 5:4 6:7 10:18 15:13 17: 18 **26**:20 **29**:20 **65**:13 **66**:3 **72**:22

N

multiple [3] 26:9,10 68:16

must [2] 4:13 81:21

mvriad [1] 67:13

N.Y [1] 1:17
name [1] 22:1
narrow [2] 69:5 70:3
NATHAN [5] 1:17 2:3,9 3:12 86:3
nature [2] 16:3 42:2
nay [1] 62:7
necessary [2] 20:13 75:17
necessities [1] 81:8
necessity [3] 47:24 81:10,12
need [8] 13:17 15:13 18:23 25:20
43:22 70:5,7 77:16
needed [1] 10:19
needs [5] 7:21 23:11 40:22 49:25

negotiable [3] 4:21 6:13 16:8 Neither [1] 37:8 network [3] 14:24 40:18 56:18 neutral [1] 85:15 never [6] 12:9,14 23:13 27:15 54: 16 67:3 New [11] 1:17 15:5.11 27:19 40:5 **47**:10.14.16 **50**:14.16 **86**:20 newer [1] 30:20 Next [1] 72:9 nobody [1] 6:23 non-Article [1] 57:9 non-germane [1] 60:5 nondisclosure [1] 61:18 nor [1] 75:23 normal [5] 26:13,18,20 29:18 36: nothing [1] 20:22 notice [2] 37:6.10 November [1] 1:10 number [4] 13:7 16:9 47:15 72:23 numbers [10] 23:1.1.4 25:1.9 32:8 48:2 72:21 79:12.21

0

objections [1] 75:3

obiects [1] 68:15

obligation [1] 50:1 obsolete [1] 15:15 obtain [4] 10:21 15:7 82:16 89:8 obtained [6] 10:16 17:23 37:8 38: 5 60:25 63:6 obtains [1] 81:23 obvious [2] 47:8,9 occurred [1] 13:20 office [1] 14:9 officer [1] 91:15 officers [2] 6:6 25:23 Okay [10] 39:21 42:24 43:1,10,11 52:23 53:5 55:12.15 82:9 old [3] 50:15 75:17 76:1 older [2] 4:9 86:12 on-line [1] 24:21 once [3] 22:2 59:3 87:8 one [31] 7:8 9:3,6,16,16 11:10 12: 24 **13**:25 **18**:1 **21**:15 **23**:22 **24**:4, 14 30:5 31:4 33:7 34:12,14,16,19 **38**:4,6,14 **51**:24 **63**:4 **65**:4 **70**:22 71:17 82:14 89:6.6 one's [1] 67:12 one-to-many [1] 44:17 one-to-one [1] 44:16 only [16] 5:6.7 7:15 9:3 11:12 14:5 **15**:1 **20**:7 **22**:2,16 **28**:24,25 **33**:6 **34**:5 **70**:10 **89**:1 open [3] 33:14 34:22 83:20 operate [1] 40:17 operating [3] 70:14 83:6 85:12 operation [1] 60:22 opinion [4] 25:3 46:11 54:21 79:

opinions [3] 25:18 35:8 46:9

opportunity [4] 37:6,11 73:1 76:

opposed [3] 14:3 27:13 35:17 opposing [1] 48:16 opposite [2] 20:17 58:16 oral [5] 1:12 2:2,5 3:12 40:1 order [21] 17:3 19:9,19 22:1 28:6 **37**:14,15,17 **40**:16 **41**:16 **67**:1 **69**: 13,15 **70**:6,8,8 **75**:15 **85**:13,24 **91**: 8 11 ordering [1] 75:22 orders [1] 21:16 ordinary [1] 63:6 original [2] 36:15 82:12 origins [1] 86:18 other [36] 6:1 7:15 9:13,18 10:21 11:12 15:23 17:21 18:19,19 24:5 25:21 28:8,13 29:5 31:7,12,15 32: 3,23 33:22 36:22 47:2 56:17 64: 17 **65**:11 **66**:21 **67**:13 **68**:3 **71**:11 **75**:1 **77**:9 **80**:7 **82**:5 **87**:19 **91**:9 Others [5] 9:25 23:23 32:5 33:6 46: out [21] 7:24 12:23 22:6.23 27:10 **41**:12 **42**:8.15 **44**:18 **54**:4 **68**:25 **69**:6 **70**:4,13 **78**:21 **81**:7,9,12 **83**:5 **87:14 89:**9 outcome [1] 86:14 outside [1] 6:21 over [18] 3:20 5:15 10:24,25 12:12 **13**:15,18 **20**:1,1,1,10 **24**:7,17 **34**: 10 68:1.16 88:22 89:1 overbreadth [1] 75:4 overrule [2] 15:14 19 overturn [1] 4:9 own [6] 4:13 40:10,19,21 41:3 80: 11

Р

PAGE [1] 2:2 pages [1] 17:14 pale [1] 30:2 paper [6] 52:15 53:12.16 54:13 55: 9 87:16 paragraph [1] 77:8 paraphrase [1] 18:5 parking [1] 29:1 parks [1] 29:1 part [5] 20:5 28:22 30:16 80:3 90:7 Parte [1] 87:16 particular [4] 8:15,17 12:22 69:3 particularity [3] 36:11 38:1 85:14 particularized [1] 70:16 particularly [4] 5:3.24 6:2 36:18 parties [5] 51:2 68:25 79:6 82:16 89:23 party [4] 50:18 75:21,22 88:13 party's [1] 83:3 passed [3] 16:8 58:2 62:13 passing [2] 4:21 6:13 passively [1] 15:4 past [1] 12:8 pause [1] 88:18 pay [1] **42:**22 pedigree [2] 86:10,12

pending [1] 38:9 people [30] 5:4 6:6 13:7 16:10,16, 19 **17**:6 **18**:13 **23**:6,23 **24**:1 **25**:10 27:2 31:21 32:15 33:1 43:3,7,9 47: 20,22 48:2,22 49:2 50:25 61:16 **79**:13,18 **82**:22 **89**:25 people's [7] 3:23 12:5,12 26:13 47:17 87:24 88:25 per [2] 12:2 30:1 percent [3] 20:6,7 27:21 perfect [1] 27:20 perfectly [2] 8:23 11:25 perhaps [7] 10:6 33:18,22 34:4 36: 14 77:1 88:21 period [13] 3:20 5:15 6:22 7:14,14 9:11 10:16 12:11 13:18,20 46:16 67:2 79:6 periodicals [1] 5:19 periods [2] 4:6 48:7 permissible [2] 71:9 73:5 permitting [1] 14:19 person [35] 5:6,16,20,20,21,23 6: 12.15 **13**:15.18 **15**:8 **19**:11 **25**:23 **29:1 41:**11.17.17 **42:**10.16 **46:**6 **48**:9,12 **51**:10 **55**:22,24,25 **56**:1,2, 3 **68**:11,12 **71**:7,17 **72**:24 **84**:17 person's [7] 5:14 24:20 25:12 43: 12 51:11 65:1 66:4 personal 3 32:18 77:3 81:11 personnel [1] 78:13 persons [1] 18:19 pervasive [1] 89:1 petition [1] 38:9 Petitioner [9] 1:4.18 2:4.10 3:13 **56**:5 **68**:15 **73**:2 **86**:4 Petitioner's [1] 3:18 phone [55] 8:5 14:7.14 15:2.3 16:9. 10,11,12 23:1,4,7,9 25:2 26:22 29: 15,16 **30**:21,25 **40**:8,14,17 **41**:11, 16,19,19,21,22,23,24,25 **43:**1,12, 16 **44**:5 **47**:21,24 **48**:2,4,11,12 **51**: 17 **60**:17,20 **64**:24 **69**:10 **72**:21,23 **73**:6 **78**:21 **79**:12,21 **80**:18 **81**:4 88:23 phones [10] 20:7,14 30:15 40:13 42:2 43:3.7 44:2 69:12 81:8 phrase [1] 60:15 physical [3] 66:4 67:19,21 pictures [1] 28:2 pieces [1] 28:8 ping [1] 14:9 pinged [2] 14:7,8 pings [1] 41:13 pinpoint [1] 28:5 place [4] 22:15 31:19 71:4 82:23 placed [2] 37:24 39:5 plant [1] 42:25 play [1] 89:17 please [5] 3:15 34:17 40:4 54:6,6 plugged [1] 45:3 pocket [1] 15:4 pockets [1] 27:22 point [16] 8:5 13:1 14:11 16:16 20: 19 22:4 28:16 48:20 61:14 63:16

64:23 68:22 81:7 82:2 86:8 89:6 pointed [5] 7:24 22:23 81:9 87:14 points [4] 17:12 19:4 30:1 86:8 police [12] 8:6,18 12:6 13:17,22 14: 20 17:8 23:16 24:6 27:16 32:4 69: policies [2] 17:22 18:9 political [1] 49:16 poses [1] 37:5 posited [2] 13:5 52:8 position [2] 31:3 57:4 positive [1] 53:9 posits [1] 73:2 possible [5] 21:23 22:7 27:12,20 39.1 possibly [1] 15:24 power [2] 27:19 82:23 practical [2] 3:23 81:6 practice [1] 35:18 pre-compliance [2] 37:7 76:16 pre-digital [1] 4:12 precedent [1] 15:14 precedents [1] 4:12 precise [8] 28:18 29:10,23 71:25 72:7,17,22 88:11 precisely [2] 15:9 61:13 precision [2] 28:24 88:8 precision-targeting [1] 72:13 prepared [1] 47:2 present [1] 72:25 preserving [1] 12:19 **Presumably** [1] **14**:10 pretrial [1] 10:20 pretty [3] 57:14 71:15 72:12 prevent [2] 56:1.4 previously [1] 66:24 principle [6] 34:9 42:3 67:9,16,16 principles [6] 40:6 74:18,19 75:11 89:6 20 privacy [26] 10:24 13:18 15:12 16: 3 17:22 19:1,15 26:11 44:16 47:4 **49**:12,25 **50**:8 **52**:1 **57**:19,25 **60**:9, 11 **61**:15 **63**:18 **64**:1,4 **71**:14 **74**: 12 84:1 88:15 private [11] 3:25,25 6:8 18:14,19 **67**:20,24 **81**:9 **84**:10 **88**:1,3 privately [1] 51:16 probable [12] 10:18 21:25 22:6 32: 9 36:10.19 37:21 43:14 48:23 50: 12 67:4 85:18 probably [4] 21:17 32:4,4 37:19 problem [3] 25:2 54:3 66:10 procedure [1] 90:19 proceed [1] 68:23 process [3] 10:20 51:18 59:23 produce [3] 40:10.24 75:22 profession [1] 33:8

program [1] 30:9

promise [1] 18:13

prongs [1] 91:4

prong [2] 19:13 91:6

proliferation [1] 29:11

proper [1] 49:14 properly [1] 85:21 property [33] 39:6 52:5,6,7,19 53: 10,17,20 **54**:4,11,17,22 **55**:1,4,7, 17,18,23 56:10,12,15 57:2,9,12,23 82:10 83:25 84:10 89:5,20,21,22 90.4 property-based [3] 38:15 51:25 **52:**15 proposed [1] 7:13 proposing [1] **10:**12 proprietary [8] 56:18 59:6 60:16, 17,19 61:1,10,11 prosecutor [2] 37:25 91:16 protect [5] 26:15 35:10 45:7 57:19 59:25 protected [9] 24:10,18 33:21 34:7 44:13 58:1 87:7.12.22 protection [11] 11:6 21:5,8 22:16 45:20 57:3,13 63:19 64:9 75:13 protections [8] 18:8 11 49:23 50: 2 73:15 74:3 75:1 77:1 protects [1] 49:2 provide [10] 3:7 10:17 16:13 35:9 **37**:4 **41**:2 **50**:12 **63**:18 **64**:8 **91**:10 provided [7] 17:8 18:16 19:7 46:4 61:17 62:12 64:5 provider [11] 14:14 22:23 41:21 **45**:17,18 **46**:4,21 **48**:4 **74**:20 **79**:1 providers [6] 17:19 29:14 61:21 69:4 73:13 87:18 provides [3] 85:13,14 91:7 provision [2] 18:22 56:23 public [7] 3:24 23:21 24:17 43:7 **44**:25 **51**:10 **71**:11 publicly [2] 6:4,5 pulls [1] 78:21 punched [1] 16:9 purchase [2] 65:20 80:20 purchases [5] 5:5 32:12 33:3,4 36:4 purchasing [1] 36:5 pure [1] 37:20 purely [1] 77:5 purposes [1] 78:17 put [3] 43:10 52:3 64:25 putting [3] 6:16 38:15 66:25

qualify [1] 7:9 quartering [1] 57:10 quashed [1] 74:17 queries [2] 24:19 34:6 question [29] 7:16 9:2 11:13 21:3 22:9 28:23 30:6 31:3 33:14 35:16 38:14 43:16 47:6 49:18 51:21 62: 15,16 63:3,10 66:7 70:21,21 75:5 78:19 80:8 84:22 86:9 90:11,23 questionable [1] 73:12 questions [3] 35:15 68:14 90:8 quick [1] 38:14 quite [18] 5:12 8:11 9:23 10:24 14: 25 17:15 18:12 19:12 20:19 21:23 34:22 38:9 44:18 48:6 49:20 65: 14 89:22 91:3 Quon [1] 63:23

R

radically [2] 22:15,19 radius [1] 29:12 raised [2] 13:3 74:20 raises [1] 68:13 raising [1] 15:12 range [1] 62:1 rapidly [2] 49:11 88:20 rare [1] 27:13 rate [1] 33:24 rather [2] 14:18 80:11 rationale [1] 12:4 reach [1] 68:25 reaches [2] 29:16 78:20 reaction [2] 64:17 65:6 reactions [1] 33:15 read [4] 18:23 24:21 45:5 60:15 real-time [2] 26:4 30:15 realize [3] 16:17 17:7 23:7 really [6] 24:3 48:21 51:25 56:13 80:2 81:2 reason [15] 6:11 16:18 19:13 31:5. 9 32:22 36:5 54:16 55:13.16 64: 21 65:16 77:17 85:3 87:5 reasonable [18] 6:21 9:13,16,17, 17 **12**:6 **16**:2 **19**:1,12 **23**:9 **32**:10 37:18 38:16 47:3 52:2,3 65:22 85: reasonableness [3] 36:2 37:1,20 reasons [4] 28:21 56:9 74:9 82:15 **REBUTTAL [2] 2:8 86:3**

receive [3] 16:11,11 40:16 receives [1] 37:10 recently [1] 63:22 recipient [1] 37:2 recognition [2] 60:10 74:15 recognize [1] 60:9 recognized [9] 45:11 49:19 54:17 56:10 73:16 86:16 87:8 88:3,24 record [8] 5:5 16:25 20:23 34:7 41: 12,17 45:25 47:25 records [46] 4:17,19 5:3,12,19 6:3 8:19 10:21 13:24 14:6 16:3 19:2,8, 14 21:1,11 22:17 23:16,18 24:19 28:17 30:13,25 31:17 32:11 33:5, 23 35:4.6.10.22 37:3 40:10.19 43:

recall [1] 71:8

regardless [5] 5:15 82:10,10 83: 25 84:1 regime [3] 57:19 70:15 73:8 regulating [1] 61:25 regulation [1] 30:8 rejected [2] 59:23 71:15

2 **46**:20.22 **48**:4 **50**:17 **67**:11.11.

11,13,18 88:5,9

referring [1] 78:6

regarded [1] 47:1

referred [1] 6:4

auilt [1] 18:6

related [6] 13:17,24 14:2 30:18 35: room [2] 14:11 34:4 sentence [1] 22:2 Solicitor [1] 1:19 23 67:21 roughly [2] 9:3 39:13 serious [2] 15:12 26:7 somebody [4] 25:10 42:5 46:5 68: relatively [2] 30:19 33:19 route [4] 41:20,23,24 46:2 serve [1] 68:21 release [1] 69:11 routed [1] 48:3 service [5] 17:19 40:15 47:23,24 somebody's [1] 42:25 someday [1] 14:14 relevance [2] 28:11 73:22 routing [4] 44:20 45:10,13,22 **87**:18 relevant [2] 20:5 36:19 rule [16] 4:2,5 7:13,19 9:21 10:12 set [5] 9:23,24 12:7 57:19 62:22 somehow [1] 74:7 reliable [1] 50:10 **12**:1 **14**:17,17 **23**:13 **25**:5 **28**:20 setting [1] 80:11 someone [4] 6:22 43:2 52:10 69:8 reliably [1] 89:10 67:7 10 88:16 90:20 settled [1] 89:1 someone's [1] 43:11 reliance [2] 47:10 90:18 rules [2] 61:18 64:3 seven [3] 14:23 27:17 29:9 sometimes [1] 53:25 relvina [2] 18:3 79:1 run [2] 17:14 21:16 several [5] 67:25.25 86:7 89:11 90: somewhat [1] 77:4 remain [3] 3:25 18:14 88:1 running [1] 69:10 sorry [4] 7:17.20 34:17 38:14 remand [1] 91:2 severe [2] 10:24 87:11 sort [5] 28:4 39:4 45:23.24 63:25 remember [1] 22:10 shall [3] 56:23 57:25 62:12 sorts [1] 5:25 same [12] 13:8.12 29:7 31:11.15 reminded [2] 51:25 52:16 She's [1] 8:2 SOTOMAYOR [35] 7:17.25 8:9.13. 35:24 40:24.25 42:4 62:13 63:24 removed [1] 27:15 shooter [1] 69:9 24 13:5,11 22:18 41:7 42:9,13,23 71:17 reply [2] 7:24 38:4 shooting [1] 69:8 **43**:6,15,21,25 **44**:1,10,23 **48**:14 saw [1] 8:4 represents [1] 28:1 shops [1] 10:8 **49**:1,8,9,18 **50**:20,22 **61**:20 **62**:2,9, saying [13] 13:22 22:25 50:9,17 59: **short** [7] **6**:22 **7**:9,23 **8**:11 **10**:16 request [3] 31:16 36:15 75:4 14,21 63:9 66:15 69:21 87:14 15 **62**:3,7,21 **65**:14 **77**:8 **79**:23,23 requests [1] 38:3 **37**:21 **51**:13 Sotomayor's [1] 78:18 require [3] 62:18 84:9 85:17 Shouldn't [4] 14:17 19:23 23:23 sought [5] 7:7 38:20 54:21 59:25 says [6] 8:4 48:16 51:8 53:17 58: required [9] 18:22 19:2 29:6 30:7 67:10 23 63:11 **35**:17 **36**:21 **56**:24 **62**:12 **64**:2 **show** [2] **5**:19 **61**:15 sounds [1] 80:25 scholars' [1] 17:13 requirement [5] 9:22 30:12 37:22 showing [7] 24:21 70:16 73:19.22. source [1] 39:6 se [1] 12:2 38:2 49:22 23.24 85:17 sources [1] 70:10 seal [1] 44:24 requirements [1] 36:11 shown [1] 17:9 spaces [1] 3:25 sealed [1] 87:13 requires [7] 4:8 50:3 51:17 62:23 shows [2] 17:9,16 span [2] 12:7 36:17 search [40] 3:22 4:7 13:6 14:2.20 **64**:10 **70**:15 **85**:19 shy [1] 73:13 special [3] 23:11 50:6 51:17 24:19 29:7 34:6 35:20.22 47:1 50: requiring [2] 12:1 19:6 side [3] 32:3 64:17 66:21 specific [1] 65:12 21 52:14 53:11 54:13 55:2.9 63:7 resembles [1] 55:18 sign [1] 47:22 specifically [1] 79:9 **69**:19 **75**:23 **76**:2.3.5.6.14 **78**:10. reserve [1] 38:11 signal [2] 29:16 30:21 specificity [1] 73:24 12,17,22 81:24 82:1,24 83:4,8 84: reserved [1] 82:3 signals [1] 43:12 split [1] 89:24 7 85:4,21 86:17 90:17,18 significant [3] 19:23 61:7 68:5 respect [4] 43:23 58:25 61:15 76: spoken [1] 72:24 searched [1] 24:5 significantly [1] 29:22 squarely [1] 25:5 searches [2] 13:14,14 Respondent [4] 1:7,21 2:7 40:2 sianina [1] 80:19 squashed [1] 74:17 searching [4] 19:21 49:5 68:7 84: similar [5] 67:10.23.23 68:2 72:20 response [1] 75:5 stages [2] 68:24 70:11 stake [1] 74:13 responsive [1] 37:3 similarity [2] 47:8.9 second [7] 13:25 17:20 28:22 37:6 simply [6] 35:11 36:4 41:9 46:14 rest [1] 4:13 stand [2] 84:6 87:11 **49**:6 **88**:6 **91**:11 restate [1] 18:11 72:19 84:1 standard [8] 16:23 31:12,15 37:16, secrets [1] 39:14 restrooms [1] 43:7 since [6] 14:23 31:18 61:11 64:22 19 50:14.15.16 Section [5] 19:10 56:17 59:8 60:6 result [2] 17:15 54:24 **68:14 84:**9 standards [1] 76:4 retain [1] 40:23 single [4] 7:13 9:10 46:15 88:12 start [1] 32:11 sector [2] 43:19 48:10 retained [1] 17:19 site [13] 3:18 4:7 5:1 8:7 15:7 20: started [2] 23:12 72:3 secure [1] 49:3 retention [1] 30:24 22 44:6,7 46:22 48:11 55:4 83:9,9 starts [1] 31:19 secured [1] 90:1 return [2] 22:8 51:21 sites [1] 14:6 state [10] 27:24 33:23 38:17,23 39: securities [1] 65:17 reveal [2] 4:17 72:22 situation [6] 8:25 13:4 50:6 51:4 7.10.12.12 63:17 89:17 see [8] 6:6,22 8:7,19 11:9 33:12 48: revealed [1] 59:10 55:22 76:2 stated [1] 21:24 19 **75:**16 revealing [2] 3:19 48:9 situations [1] 37:14 statement [1] 37:23 seeing [1] 31:18 reverse [1] 90:9 six [2] 11:15 22 STATES [4] 1:1 6 14 3:5 seek [1] 4:5 review [2] 37:7 76:16 Sixth [1] 90:9 statute [15] 19:7.12 58:8.10.13.22 seem [1] 17:1 revolutionary [2] 86:24 87:4 size [2] 15:9 29:13 **59:**4.5.11.13.15.17 **74:**8.13 **90:**18 seems [10] 6:7 10:11 11:6.19 16: rights [5] 41:6 49:2 61:8 73:14 83: skyrocketing [1] 29:17 statute's [1] 74:11 24 20:16 26:20 60:4 70:23 82:8 small [2] 29:11,12 statutes [2] 58:2 91:10 sees [1] 71:13 Riley [8] 4:10 81:1,7,17,23 82:3 86: smart [2] 33:24 34:2 statutory [7] 19:3 70:15,22 73:8 seizure [1] 75:24 11 88:25 smartphone [3] 24:23 29:18 34:1 **75**:13 **89**:6 **91**:6 select [1] 37:3 rip [1] 83:20 Smith [20] 4:4 15:25 18:5 22:10,20 stayed [1] 5:21 sending [1] 41:12 risk [3] 9:20,20 37:5 **25**:6 **35**:3 **40**:25 **41**:15 **42**:3 **44**:13 steal [1] 52:10 sense [4] 61:10 75:23,24 81:6 robber [4] 8:4,5,17 21:19 45:11,23 50:24 51:6,7 52:5 72:20 Steer [1] 73:17 sensible [1] 80:8 robberies [1] 36:18 79:10 81:9 step [3] 6:20 27:15 88:22 sensitive [21] 4:18,24 5:1,2,9,12, robbery [5] 7:8,9 9:3,16,18 snitches [1] 82:18 Stewart [1] 79:10 18 **15**:21 **24**:18 **25**:8,11 **31**:17 **35**: ROBERTS [21] 3:3 11:3.17 12:13 snoop [1] 31:20 stick [3] 53:4 54:1.7 3,10 **49**:20 **70**:10 **74**:24 **79**:18 **80**: 31:2 34:12.16 35:13 39:23 41:8 snoops [1] 82:18 stick-up [1] 29:4 1 87:25 88:4 sticks [2] 89:24 90:5 64:14 74:2 80:22.25 81:7 84:12. social [1] 15:5 sensitivity [6] 16:4 25:15.19 74: still [3] 24:17 48:17 75:10 15.21 **85**:10.25 **91**:19 society [2] 6:23 51:8 21 77:21 87:23 role [1] 34:8 stole [1] 38:20 Society's [1] 46:12

stolen [1] 52:13 store [1] 29:3 Stored [6] 19:5,18 20:4 63:24 64:6 91.6 straightforward [1] 33:19 stream [2] 4:22 6:16 street [1] 29:2 strip [2] 57:2,11 strong [3] 17:16 19:15 91:3 strongly [2] 17:16 18:12 struggling [1] 35:2 stuff [1] 36:6 subject [5] 21:12 37:10 57:9 74:16 82:5 submission [1] 36:20 submit [1] 79:14 submitted [3] 42:21 91:20,22 subpoena [21] 21:9 25:1 31:12,13, 15 **36**:22,24 **37**:9 **74**:14 **75**:7,20 **79**:25 **80**:11 **83**:12,18,24 **84**:16 **85**: 19 **86:**8.10 **87:**10 subpoena-like [1] 31:16 subpoenas [11] 31:6.7.11 37:1 73: 15 74:16 75:12 76:25 79:3 84:6 subscribes [2] 5:20 40:14 suburban [1] 29:21 **suggested** [2] **9:8 11:**15 suggesting [1] 28:2 suggestion [3] 12:3 13:19 30:6 suggests [1] 23:12 **summarized** [1] **73**:18 summed [1] 73:17 supervision [2] 20:1 85:13 suppose [7] 7:6 10:7 24:24,25 25: 22 26:6 52:17 suppressed [1] 90:16 SUPREME [4] 1:1.13 11:13 75:18 Surveillance [4] 6:6 26:9 46:24 **47**:5 surveilling [1] 68:12 survey [2] 17:15 48:15 surveys [1] 49:13 suspect [2] 34:19 47:5 suspects [1] 70:3 suspicion [1] 37:19 sweep [1] 14:4 sweeping [1] 13:6 sweet [1] 59:21 sworn [2] 37:23 50:11 system [1] 30:17 systems [1] 40:12

Τ

T-Mobile [1] 52:11
tailing [2] 27:12 68:15
targeting [1] 8:14
taught [1] 51:24
technical [1] 30:5
technique [1] 69:23
technological [2] 22:12 42:1
technology [15] 14:24 15:12 27:
11,25 35:25 40:5 43:23 47:10,14
49:12 64:22 66:6 72:6 88:20,25

Telecommunications [5] 18:12 45:5 61:17.21 90:2 telephone [9] 8:19 23:1,3 44:11, 12 **45**:2 **51**:1 **61**:25 **81**:10 telephones [1] 45:2 teller [1] 8:3 tells [1] 84:16 term [7] 7:3,10,23 8:12 10:6,25 87: terms [3] 36:2 80:4 85:7 terrorism [2] 32:7 65:18 test [3] 12:15 78:2.10 testing [1] 77:5 text [3] 15:2 16:11 64:4 theory [2] 71:9 88:10 there's [30] 11:6 13:19 16:17 18: 22 19:13,15 23:8 26:20 27:2,5,11 **30**:11,12,23,23 **32**:13 **37**:23 **44**:4 **55**:4 **69**:8 **74**:12,13,24 **75**:12 **76**:3, 15 80:2.16.18 83:8 therefore [5] 52:14 53:11 55:2 60: 18 65:24 thermostat [1] 34:2 thev'll [1] 33:6 They've [2] 50:9 67:17 thief [1] 38:19 thinking [2] 20:20 34:21 thinks [1] 79:15 third [9] 50:18 51:2,9 68:25 79:6 82:16 83:2 88:13,17 third-party [19] 11:8 21:11 23:14 **37**:9 **41**:4 **55**:24,25 **63**:5,16 **64**:19, 19 **69**:4 **72**:15 **75**:2 **79**:1,25 **80**:5 82:9 84:2 third-party's [1] 63:10 though [6] 3:6 10:23 23:17 41:9 81:2 83:15 threat [1] 23:11 threaten [1] 18:6 three [2] 11:23 17:12 three-day [1] 36:17 Three-tenths [1] 20:6 throw [1] 32:23 **TIMOTHY** [1] 1:3 today [13] 5:3 14:22 15:1,6 17:5,22 **19**:18 **20**:10 **22**:13 **27**:16 **31**:5 **43**: together [3] 29:20 64:25 67:1 tomorrow [1] 70:20 tone [1] 16:10 tort [1] 39:4 totally [1] 34:8 touch [6] 16:10 21:8 23:19,23 24:2 **37**:20 tower [9] 8:2,6,14 13:4 47:25 64: 24 66:24 69:22 72:2 towers [6] 16:21 20:9 29:17,19 40: 16 80:12 track [6] 23:3 24:6 27:16 30:15 66: 4 67:1 tracked [2] 6:25 28:25 tracking [9] 12:22 24:22 27:20 33:

25 47:11,14 71:18,25 72:18

tracks [1] 65:1

trade [1] 39:14 traditional 5 21:8 29:19 81:24 84:5 85:18 traditionally [1] 12:8 trailing [1] 27:12 traits [1] 56:13 transaction [4] 6:13,14 42:19 46: transactions [5] 40:11 41:3 42:6 15 **81**:13 transfer [2] 4:22 6:17 transferred [1] 56:15 transfers [1] 54:4 transit [1] 87:13 travel [1] 67:12 treat [4] 31:5,6 56:14 61:1 tremendous [1] 26:8 trespatory [1] 47:1 troops [1] 57:11 trouble [2] 3:9 33:13 true [9] 29:8 30:13 41:15.15 45:8 **62**:24 **63**:1 **65**:14 **86**:22 trumped [2] 58:8 80:9 trumps [1] 58:13 trying [4] 12:2 55:21 60:5,6 turn [1] 14:14 TV [1] 17:8 two [9] 12:20 16:1 19:7 33:7 36:17, 25 63:4 88:23 91:7 type [1] 13:4 types [3] 9:22 33:22 91:3 typically [1] 26:14 Uber [1] 67:12

under [29] 19:9 31:7.7 32:19 35:15 18 36:16 38:23 40:7 41:4 47:3 52: 15 **54**:10 **57**:24 **63**:4 **70**:15 **73**:7.9. 12 74:14,17 77:25 78:19 82:23 83: 5.6 85:12 89:20 90:16 under-inclusive [1] 24:13 underlying [1] 61:8 understand [15] 5:17 11:4,18 12: 25 14:7 17:17 33:9 39:8 43:18 49: 21 74:24 75:15 79:22 89:13 90:25 understanding [7] 27:24 44:19 49:25 82:12 84:5 86:20,25 understands [1] 42:20 understood [1] 19:17 undressing [1] 14:12 unduly [4] 73:15.25.25 74:16 unfair [1] 66:7 UNITED [4] 1:1,6,13 3:5 unless [1] 13:19 Unlike [4] 16:7 36:22 87:15 91:12 unlikely [2] 26:3,4 unreasonable [2] 65:2 67:5 unsworn [1] 91:15 up [11] 17:5,5 18:7 47:23 51:22 57: 19 **73**:17 **80**:11.19 **81**:17 **89**:24 urban [1] 29:20 urgent [1] 23:10

unadministrable [2] 24:13 34:23

unavailable [1] 66:24

urine [2] **78**:10,14 usage [1] **29**:18 useful [2] **28**:12,13 users [1] **29**:18 uses [2] **41**:19 **42**:8 using [5] **27**:11 **43**:12 **45**:25 **80**:20 **81**:19

V

vaque [1] 28:5

valid [1] 79:7

value [2] 38:21 52:13 vehicles [1] 26:9 venture [1] 41:10 versus [6] 3:5 4:4 71:22 73:17 75: 25 90:17 view [8] 7:10 22:14 28:10 58:12 73: 9 85:6,22 88:14 village [1] 31:20 violate [1] 7:10 violations [3] 65:17,18,18 virtually [1] 35:8 visited [1] 5:23 vitiate [2] 45:19 88:14 voluminous [1] 29:24 voluntarily [2] 4:20 16:5 voluntariness [5] 16:7 80:3.15.17.

W

voluntary [2] 4:24 25:7

vulnerable [1] 24:23

wait [2] 65:10 88:18 walk [2] 70:18 75:6 wanted [5] 22:5 61:15 76:20 82:24. war [1] 82:15 warned [1] 79:11 warrant [25] 4:8 10:18 12:1 19:2,9, 13 **21**:18,21 **35**:16,17,19 **36**:1,11, 17,21 **37**:14,15 **48**:24 **50**:8 **51**:3, 13 **65:**22 **74:**5 **91:**8.12 warrantless [1] 3:17 warrants [2] 84:7 91:14 **Washington** [2] 1:9,20 watch [1] 33:25 watches [1] 71:13 watching [2] 47:18,21 watershed [1] 56:14 way [7] 6:25 7:18 42:24 61:6 64:25 71:14 87:15 ways [4] 9:13 42:14 48:8 71:2 weather [1] 15:5 web [1] 24:20 Wednesday [1] 1:10 week [1] 27:17 weeks [1] 11:23 weigh [1] 36:25 weight [2] 19:24 21:3 welded [1] 67:6 well-developed [1] 51:6 WESSLER [65] 1:17 2:3,9 3:11,12, 14 **4**:5,16 **5**:10 **6**:10 **7**:12,20 **8**:9, 22 **9**:7,19 **10**:10,14 **11**:12,24 **13**:2

14:21 15:11,25 17:12 18:21 20:3, 15,18 21:6,22 24:8 25:4,13,17 26: 1,12 **27**:4,8,23 **28**:15 **30**:4,11 **31**:8 **33**:16 **34**:13 **35**:1 **36**:9 **37**:16 **38**: 13,25 39:4,12,16,19,22 72:5 86:2, 3,5 87:3 89:16 90:14,21 91:1 whatever [6] 8:21 9:21 11:23 36:4

41:13 **65**:2

whereabouts [1] 6:5 whereas [1] 83:7 Whereupon [1] 91:21 wherever [1] 33:4

whether [13] 16:4,16 17:4 22:5 35: 16,17 **69:**2,3 **71:**4 **74:**4 **80:**2 **82:**4 84:22

white [1] 32:5

white-collar [2] 65:17 76:24 whole [4] 12:16 59:18 82:8 84:22 wide [1] 44:8

wider [1] 10:19

will [26] 3:25 5:5,5,7,8 6:24 17:4,6, 9 18:13 19:25 32:24 33:1 34:7,13 36:11,12 40:15 42:21 43:16 48:19, 22 59:9 67:9 85:5 91:1

wind [1] 51:22 window [1] 69:24 wishes [1] 9:9

within [3] 25:5 28:25 88:12

without [13] 18:14 23:16 40:13 43: 14 48:23 50:8 51:3 62:7 65:22 67:

4 78:11 83:11,11 witness [2] 22:3 68:21

witnesses [3] 12:9 40:9 69:9

witnessing [1] 51:11 wondering [1] 39:10

word [3] 32:5 75:23,24

words [2] 18:23 71:12

work [3] 36:12 77:9,15

world [3] 71:12,19 80:8

worry [1] 66:3

worse [1] 25:24 worth [1] 9:25

writ [4] 83:5,16,18,19

write [2] 33:11 42:6

writes [1] 42:20

writing [1] 77:7

writs [2] 82:13,22

years [4] 14:23 29:9 89:11,18

yield [1] 58:4 yielded [1] 86:20 yields [1] 58:1

York [1] 1:17 young [1] 43:3

yourself [2] 44:25 86:15

zero [1] 21:3 zillion [1] 42:14